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NOTES
A REDEFINITION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS*
STATUTORY procedures for judicial review of federal regulatory agencies
have been enacted with a double purpose: to permit expedient administrative
action and to confine it within the alembic of the Constitution.' Comple-
menting this balance of objectives are the principles adopted by the courts
that administrative remedies must be exhausted before a petition for review
will be granted,2 and that review may not be had at all until a "final" order
has been issued. 3 The apparent tendency of the judiciary, moreover, has been
to enlarge greatly the categories of non-reviewable orders ;4 and as a result,
courts, forced by "hard cases", have attempted to escape the strictures of an
inordinate nomenclature by indicating the availability of an extra-statutory
equity jurisdiction to review "non-reviewable" orders.3  Recently, however,
the Supreme Court promulgated a clarified rule of judicial review0 which
went far toward clearing away many of the superficial distinctions which long
had fettered its application.7
The rationale of non-reviewability is easily discernible. Preliminary issues
may disappear in the course of administrative procedure; and by delaying
judicial review until some final determinative action has been taken by a
commission, the court has fewer and more precisely defined questions to
*Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, U. S. Sup. Ct. (1939), 6 U. S. L.
IVEEi 1133.
1. See McGuire, Judicial Reviezes of Administralth, Derisions (1938) 26 Gm. L
J. 574, 586. For typical statutory procedures, see 52 ST.,. 112, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (c)
(Supp. 1938); 48 STAT. 901, 15 U. S. C. § 78 y (a) (1934); 50 STAT. 85, 15 U. S. C.
§ 836(b) (Supp. 1937); 49 STAT. 860 (1935), 16 U. S. C. § P-5 1 (Supp. 1938); 38
STAT. 219, 220 (1913), 28 U. S. C. §§41 (28), 46, 47 (1934); 49 STT. 455 (1935),
29 U. S. C. § 160 (f) (Supp. 1938); 48 STAT. 1093 (1934), 47 U. S. C. §402 (Supp.
1938).
2. fyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 50 (1938); Berger,
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies (1939) 48 YAE L. J. 981; Note (1927) 7 CoL.
L. REv. 450.
3. Federal Power Commission v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U. S. 375, 35
(1938). See Comment (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 766.
4. See American Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Board, App.
D. C. (1939) 4 L. R. R. 34, 35.
5. Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R. R., 59 S. Ct. 160 (U. S. 1938); Utah Fuel Co.
v. National Bituminous Coal Commission, 59 S. Ct. 409 (U. S. 1939); American Fed-
eration of Labor v. National Labor Relations Board, App. D. C. (1939) 4 L. R. R. 34.
6. Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, U. S. Sup. Ct. (1939), 6 U. S. L.
,VEEK 1133.
7. The "affirmative" and "negative" order doctrine, for example, was first expound-
ed in 1912. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U. S. 282 (1912).
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consider.8 In this respect the purpose is not unlike that of the final judg-
ment rule in the judicial process.9 Erroneous preliminary orders are sus-
ceptible of correction by the administrative body at hearings provided by
statute.' 0 Moreover those orders which must be enforced through the courts
will receive an early judicial determination in any event; and review of
intermediate orders may be deferred until the review of the ultimate order."
A final and very persuasive argument for non-revievability is that admin-
istrative bodies ought to be permitted a full opportunity to resolve the tech-
nical problems before them prior to judicial interference. 12
While the rationale and policy of reviewability are clear, the categories
of reviewable orders, previous to the decision in the instant case13 were neither
clear nor purposive.14 Form and substance had been used alternately as tests,15
Finality and enforceability of the order became merely some indicia.1 Among
the types of orders held non-reviewable were those denying exemption from
statutory obligations;17 those enforceable by the Attorney-General at his dis-
8. United States v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. R., 273 U. S. 299, 311 (1927). United
States v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 226, 233 (1938) ; State v. Superior Court, 87 P. (2d) 294,
296 (Wash. 1939); McGuire, supra note 1 at 580; Comment (1938) 47 YALE L. 3. 766,
769, 772.
9. See Crick, The Final Judgin ut as a Basis for Appeal (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 539.
10. See United States v. Illinois Central R. R., 291 U. S. 457, 463 (1934); Caro-
lina Aluminum Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 97 F. (2d) 435, 438 (C. C. A. 4th,
1938).
11. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 48 (1938); Dupont
& Co. v. Boland, 85 F. (2d) 12, 15 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936); H. R. REP. No. 1147, 74th
Cong. 1st Sess. (1935) 24.
12. See United States Navigation Co., Inc. v. Cunard Steamship Co., Ltd., 284
U. S. 474, 482 (1932) ; Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Trade Commission, 280 Fed.
45, 48 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922); DIcKINsoN, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY
OF LAW (1927) 71-73; 254; LANDIS, THE AimuasmATriv PROCESS (1938) 141; Cooper,
Administrative Justice and the Role of Discretion (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 577, 600.
13. Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, U. S. Sup. Ct. (1939), 6 U. S. L.
WEEK 1133.
14. Comment (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 766.
15. Compare Alton R. R. v. United States, 287 U. S. 229 (1932) with Proctor &
Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U. S. 282 (1912); Newport Electric Power Corp.
v. Federal Power Commission, 97 F. (2d) 580 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) with Pacific Power
& Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 98 F. (2d) 835 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938);
Powell v. United States, 300 U. S. 276 (1937) and American Sumatra Tobacco Corp.
v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 93 F. (2d) 236 (App. D. C. 1937), with MIl-
lory Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission, 99 F. (2d) 399 (App. D. C.
1938).
16. See Mallory Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission, 99 F. (2d)
399, 405 (App. D. C. 1938); cf. United States v. Idaho, 298 U. S. 105 (1936) (order
need not be enforceable to be reviewable). Compare Intermountain Rate Cases, 234
U. S. 476 (1914) with Lehigh Valley R. R. v. United States, 243 U. S. 412 (1917) and
Piedmont & Northern Ry. v. United States, 280 U. S. 469 (1930).
17. Piedmont & Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 280 U. S. 469 (1930) ; Newport
Electric Power Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 97 F. (2d) 580 (C. C. A. 2d,
1938).
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cretion; s18 those which were deemed to be merely declarations of "status"
or findings;19 and those preliminary to further administrative action.23
Numerous decisions indicated that administrative orders could be judicially
reviewed under statutory procedure only if they were final and if they
demanded or directed that a particular thing be done.21
Restricted by these artificial classifications, recent decisions portended an
unwonted development in the availability and scope of judicial review.2- For
despite previous decisions declaring statutory appeals the only available
method, 2 the Supreme Court twice conceded an equitable jurisdiction in
the district courts to determine the validity of administrative orders thought
to be not reviewable by appeal, and the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia likewise suggested the availability of such equitable jurisdiction.
These opinions bore startling implications: they admitted of a jurisdiction
to review administrative orders in single-judge district courts, whereas Con-
gress has established and evidently deemed advisable appellate review by
circuit courts, and in some instances by three-judge district courts.24
18. Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U. S. 160 (1927); Fed-
eral Trade Commission v. Maynard Coal Co., 22 F. (2d) 873 (App. D. C. 1927).
19. United States v. Los Angeles & S. L. K. Rk, 273 U. S. 299 (1927) (valuation);
Shannahan v. United States, 303 U. S. 596 (1933) (interurban character of railroad).
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938) (findings of jurisdictional
facts); Carolina Aluminum Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 97 F. (2d) 435 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1938) (interference by dams with navigation).
20. Orders to file information for use in hearings: Federal Power Commission v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U. S. 375 (1938); Securities and Exchange Commission
v. Andrews, 88 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937). Procedural orders: Thtird Ave. Ry.
v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 85 F. (2d) 914 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936); New
York, 0. & W. Ry. v. United States, 14 F. (2d) 850 (S. D. N. Y. 1926). Expressions
of administrati'e ophzion: United States v. Atlanta, B. & C. IL R., 282 U. S. .9--
(1931); United States v. Donahue Bros., Inc., 59 F. (2d) 1019 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932);
Ames Baldwin Wyoming Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 73 F. (2d) 489 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1934).
21. See United States v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 226, 234 (1938); Shannahan v. United
States, 303 U. S. 596, 599 (1938); Shields v. Utah Idaho Central P. R., 59 S. Ct. 169,
163 (U. S. 1938); American Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Board,
App. D. C. (1939) 4 L. R. R. 34. Compare an earlier view expressed in The Chicago
Junction case, 264 U. S. 258, 263 (1924).
22. See cases cited suipra note 5.
23. Various unsuccessful efforts have been made to obtain a judicial review in a
manner other than by statutory appeal or statutory injunction. See, e.g., injunction:
Sykes v. Jenny "Wren Co., 78 F. (2d) 729 (App. D. C. 1935), (1936) 49 Honv. L. RE%.
659; Resources Corp. International v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 24 F. Supp.
580 (D. D. C. 1938); certiorari: Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Trade Commission,
280 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922); Southern Transport Co. v. Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, 61 F. (2d) 925 (App. D. C. 1932); inandanzus: Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion v. Campbell, 289 U. S. 385 (1933); prohibition: United States v. Interstate Com-
merce Commission, 51 F. (2d) 429 (App. D. C. 1931); quia timet: Mhite v. Johmson,
282 U. S. 367 (1931) ; declaratory judgment: Piedmont & Northern Ry. v. United States,
280 U. S. 469 (1930).
24. See statutes cited supra note 1.
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In the first of these cases, Shields v. Utah Idaho Central Railroad,2 5 the
Interstate Commerce Commission had issued, pursuant to proper statutory
procedure, an order declaring an electric railroad to be non-interurban and
therefore subject to the Railway Labor Act,20 rather than excepted from it,
as the railroad contended.2 7 The order was made upon the petition of the
National Mediation Board filed in accordance with the Railway Labor Act
and laid the basis for possible further action by the Board or by the United
States Attorney in the enforcement of that Act; but it was binding on the
Board and the railroad and contemplated no further action by the Commerce
Commission. As a declaration of "status," however, such an order was not,
according to a previous determination of the Supreme Court,25 reviewable
by the statutory method provided in the Urgent Deficiencies Act.2 9 The
issue involved in the case was one which very probably would have survived
further proceedings by the administrative agency, and would have been pre-
sented in identical form to any court in which compliance by the railroad
with the Act or with an order of the Mediation Board would have been
sought.30 The Supreme Court held that the district court had jurisdiction of
the railroad's suit to enjoin the United States Attorney from prosecuting it
for alleged violation of the Railway Labor Act; it denied a contention that
the court could try de novo31 the question whether the railroad was inter-
urban; and it held that the review was limited to the question whether the
Commission's determination was properly made within its delegated authority.
Review under the Urgent Deficiencies Act would have been precisely the
same.
In a second case, the Supreme Court accepted the view of the district court
that the latter had jurisdiction in equity to review an order of the Bituminous
Coal Commission, and agreed that the petitioner failed on the merits alone.82
The Coal Commission had announced that it would reveal in public hearings
certain information previously received from coal operators, pursuant to an
order of the Commission, and ordered the Secretary of the Commission to
25. 59 S. Ct. 160 (U. S. 1938).
26. 48 STAT. 1185, 45 U. S. C. § 151 (1934).
27. If the railroad were excepted from the Railway Labor Act, it would be subject
to the NLRA, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151 ct seq. (Supp. 1938).
28. Shannahan v. United States, 303 U. S. 596 (1938).
29. 38 STAT. 219, 220 (1913), 28 U. S. C. §§41, 46, 47 (1934).
30. See Saxton Coal Mining Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission, 96 F.
(2d) 517, 518 (App. D. C. 1938). State v. Superior Court, 87 P. (2d) 294, 296 (Wash,
1939). It has been said that the policy behind the final judgment rule is to prevent
causes from coming to appellate courts in fragments and occasioning delays. See Can-
ter, Adm'x v. American Insurance Co., 3 Peters 307, 318 (U. S. 1830). But in the
situations envisaged by the text, appeals from the orders would have finally and imme-
diately settled the controversies.
31. But legislative declarations or findings are necessarily subject to an independent
judicial review upon the facts and the law whenever rights of either persons or prop-
erty are involved which are protected by constitutional restrictions. See St. ,oseph
Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 51 (1936).




make the information available for inspection by interested parties prior
to the hearing. Petitioner claimed that the information was confidential and
that the Commission was prohibited by the Act from revealing it. While
some conflict had appeared as to the reviewability of this type of order,
it had been held in an earlier adjudication of this case that the order was
not reviewable under the statutory procedure.3 4 A postponement in the
review of the order, however, until after some "reviewable" order were made
would have rendered useless a judicial determination of the legality of the
announced disclosure. This, then, was an instance in which the issue involved
could not have been determined except on direct appeal from the precise
order or by proceedings in equity. And it is relevant to note that the statute
allowing an appeal from orders of the Coal Commission did not stipulate that
the order must be a "final" one.a5
A somewhat similar situation arose out of an order of the National Labor
Relations Board that the appropriate unit for election of West Coast long-
shoremen representatives should comprise some two hundred employers rather
than single employers. This order precluded the American Federation of
Labor from representation, destroying the Union's effectiveness in a large
area. On an appeal from the order by the Federation, the Circuit Court of
Appeals felt compelled by Supreme Court decisions to hold the order non-
reviewable, but indicated quite clearly the availability of an equitable remedy. 0
The only possible manner in which the Federation could have had the order
reviewed directly by the court of appeals would have been for some employer
to refuse to bargain with representatives elected in this unit, be charged with
an unfair labor practice by the Board, be ordered by the Board to bargain
and petition a Circuit Court for review of the Latter order or be made
respondent on a petition by the Board to enforce the order. Even then the
Federation could come in only as intervener. While the National Labor
Relations Act specifies that an appellate review will lie from "final" orders,3
the circuit court was constrained to declare this order non-reviewable, not
because it was not "final," but because nothing was demanded or directed.
In fact, the court freely conceded that, with respect to the Federation, the
order was "final" and that all administrative remedies had been exhausted.
The Statute, therefore, apparently did not compel the decision in this instance
also.
In both cases the orders involved an interpretation of administrative powers
under a statute. The determinations by the commissions relating to such
33. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. -. Securities and Exchange Commission, 93
F. (2d) 236 (App. D. C. 1937). (1937) 51 HAR%% L. REv. 159; cf. Third Ave. Ry. v.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 85 F. (2d) 914 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936); Mallory
Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission, 99 F. (2d) 399 (App. D. C. 1933).
34. Mallory Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission, 99 F. (2d) 399
(App. D. C. 1938).
35. 50 STAT. 85, 15 U. S. C. § 836 (b) (Supp. 1937).
36. American Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Board, App. D. C.
(1939) 4 L. R. R. 34.
37. 49 STAT. 455 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 160 (f) (Supp. 1938).
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questions of law3 8 were not as peculiarly in performance of an administrative
function as findings of technical questions of fact and lay well within the
judicial province.39 Moreover, in view of the fact that the orders were deemed
reviewable in equity, they were within the judicial power and direct review
should have been allowed. 40 The essential fact in each case is that the Supreme
Court did concede that a single-judge district court did have jurisdiction to
review these orders of administrative commissions.41 Yet the normal courts
of review prescribed by statute are the Circuit Courts of Appeals. One
consequence of these holdings may be the further delay occasioned by the
possibility of an additional judicial appeal through the circuit courts to the
Supreme Court rather than the possible single appeal to the Supreme Court
under statutory procedures. 42 Reasons of finality and expedition would seem
to militate in favor of an early judicial review under statutory procedure in
these types of cases. Another consequence is to route to the district courts
sporadic cases in a field otherwise exclusively occupied by the circuit courts
and beyond the experience of the district courts.
Such decisions were obviously an excrescence resulting from judicially
imposed obstructions to a rational doctrine of reviewability. The logical but
revolutionary consequence was a redefinition of the standards of review-
ability; and in the Rochester case the Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, initiated this process. The affirmative or negative nature of an
order was declared to be no longer "useful" as a "touchstone" of jurisdiction.
38. There has been much discussion as to the feasibility of a distinction in methods
of review accordingly as the issues relate to law or fact. See LANDIS, Tim ADrINIS-
TRTIW PROCESS (1938) 146; FREUND, Historical Survey in GRoWTH OF AmmiUCAm
ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW (1923) 32; Fuchs, Concepts and Policies in Anglo-Amcrican Ad-
minstrative Law Theory (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 538, 564. For a discussion of adminis-
trative determinations of jurisdictional facts see Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial
Review of Administrative Determinations of Questions of "Constitutional Fact" (1932)
80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1055.
39. See Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U. S. 285, 290 (1922);
United States v. Idaho, 298 U. S. 105, 109 (1936). Where the question involved is purely
legal it has been held unnecessary to exhaust the administrative remedy first. See Gully
v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 82 F. (2d) 145, 147-148 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
40. The frequent use of equity jurisdiction in federal courts to enjoin orders and
requirements of state administrative bodies does not indicate the wisdom of equitable
proceedings to review the orders of federal agencies. For, in regard to the state bodies
there would be in many cases no federal remedy at all except in the equity courts. Di Gio-
vanni v. Camden Fire Insurance Ass'n, 296 U. S. 64 (1935); see Petroleum Explora-
tion, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 304 U. S. 209, 217 (1938); (1934) 33 Micn,
L. REv. 118.
41. Congress has clearly placed the jurisdiction to review in the circuit courts or
in specially constituted district courts. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303
U. S. 41, 48 (1938). Some of the statutes providing for review in the circuit courts
read, "Such court shall have exclusive jurisdiction." See 48 STAT. 901, 15 U. S. C.
§ 78 y (a) (1934); 50 STAT. 86, 15 U. S. C. § 836 (b) (Supp. 1937); 49 STAT. 860
(1935), 16 U. S. C. § 825 1 (b) (Supp. 1938) ; 49 STAT. 455 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 160
(f) (Supp. 1938); Resources Corp. International v. Securities and Exchange Comnmis-
sion, 24 F. Supp. 580, 581 (D. C. C. 1938).
42. See statutes cited supra note 1.
In substitution of such criteria, the Court found considerations of policy
to be completely satisfied by the requirements that technical matters per-
taining to the function of an administrative body must first be determined
by it, and that only questions affecting constitutional power, statutory author-
ity or the basic prerequisites of proof could be raised at all.Y Other standards
were not so dearly defined, but it was indicated that the order must be such
that any judgment rendered would be a final basis of action as between com-
mission and party seeking review.+
Although the opinion seemingly attempted to escape the strictures of
classification, it did indicate three general categories into which prior decisions
under the "negative order doctrine" fell. The first group was stated to be
that of non-reviewable orders and included those which would have the effect
of forbidding or compelling conduct only on the contingency of some further
action by the commission. Valuations were listed as an example.5 The
definition was also expressly made to include the order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission at issue in fie Shields case.40 However, it would
seem that the case may well fall more properly in the second group defined as
reviewable. This group includes those orders declining to relieve the com-
plainant from a statutory command forbidding or compelling conduct on his
part.47 Plainly in the Shidds case the complainant preferred to be subject
to the National Labor Relations Act rather than the Railway Labor Act,
and the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission was in effect a denial
of exemption from the Railway Labor Act. Moreover, by casting doubt on
the validity of the determination in the Piedmont & Northern Railroad case,49
involving a similar declaration of non-interurban character, the Court would
now seem to be amenable to reviewability of like orders.
The precise holding on the facts of the Rochester case lends support to this
conclusion. For the order there complained of was made by the Federal
Communications Commission in determining that a telephone corporation was
engaged in interstate commerce through physical connection with the facilities
of another carrier controlling it or controlled in common with it. As a result
43. For a discussion of the scope of judicial review of administrative orders see
Cooper, Administrative Justice and The Role of Discretion (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 577.
44. This would seem to be satisfied by the requirements for the exercise of the
judicial power that there be a "case or controversy." United States Y. Mushrat, 219
U. S. 346 (1911).
45. Delaware & Hudson Co. v. United States, 266 U. S. 43S (1925) ; United States
v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. R-, 273 U. S. 299 (1927).
46. United States v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. R., 273 U. S. 299 (1927).
47. Orders denying authority to act under the terms of a statute followed by legal
consequences, [Lehigh Valley R. R. v. United States, 243 U. S. 412 (1917)] and orders
denying exemption from the terms of a statute [Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476
(1914)] were given as examples.
48. Piedmont & Northern M. R. v. United States, 280 U. S. 469 (1930). The Court
expressly overruled Lehigh Valley R. R. v. United States, 243 U. S. 412 (1917) in
which the Commerce Commission had issued an order denying petitioner relief from
certain statutory requirements, but it only criticized the ruling of the Piedmont case.
See Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, U. S. Sup. Ct (1939), 6 U. S. L.
NV= 1133, 1135 n. 11, 12.
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of this finding the corporation was made subject to the mandatory orders
of the Communications Commission addressed generally to carriers within
its jurisdiction. Whether the latter fact was necessary to a declaration of
reviewability is not clear from the opinion, but in the Shields case the order
likewise subjected the railway to duties imposed by the Railway Labor Act
and the railroad would be liable for disobedience without further action by
the Board.49 This second group, therefore, which includes both orders deny-
ing authority to act within the terms of a statute and orders denying exemption
from the obligations of a statute may reasonably be subject to further en-
largement.
While it is dangerous practice to speculate as to the precise group in which
particular orders fall, it may be ventured that an order like that in the
Bituminous Coal Commission case likewise comes within this group, rather
than within the procedural orders or preliminary findings of Group I. For
the disclosure of secret information in that case came after an administrative
determination of authority under a particular statutory provision and, as
already pointed out, the issue had elements of complete finality.
The third group defined by the Court includes those which refuse to compel
or forbid conduct by a third party. By placing this group within the field of
reviewable orders, the Court expressly overruled its 1912 determination in
Proctor & Gamble v. United States.50 There an order which denied a recovery
of demurrage from certain railroads and which refused to set aside adminis-
trative rules allowing demurrage charges was held non-reviewable. In com-
menting on that case, the present Court stated that an order no longer need
be one enforceable by the administrative agency to be reviewable. Issues,
therefore, like those arising in the American Federation of Labor case would
clearly seem to be embraced within this group. The order there complained
of also refused to compel certain conduct by third parties, the employers,
and essential elements of finality were existent.
The precise effect of Mr. justice Frankfurter's opinion in the Rochester
case cannot be presently evaluated, for a decision exploding long-established
criteria and setting forth on a new course presents but a hint of what may
lie ahead. The opinion does, however, permit further redefinition of review-
able orders in accordance with rational basic concepts concerning the relation
between courts and administrative tribunals; and it provides a flexibility in
judicial review of administrative orders which may well prevent the resort
to multifarious, extra-statutory escapes arising from a rigid classification
of reviewable ordersY1
49. 48 STAT. 1186, 45 U. S. C. § 152 (1934).
50. 225 U. S. 282 (1912).
51. The final judgment rule in the judicial process has likewise been subject to strict
classification with the unwanted result of forcing many reviews through various forms
of extraordinary writs. See Crick, The Final Jvdgment as a Basis for APpeal (1932)
41 YALE L. J. 539, 553.
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BACK PAY ORDERS UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT*
To EFFECTUATE the policies of the National Labor Relations Act,1 the Labor
Board is empowered to order reinstatement, with or without back pay, of
employees who have been victims of unfair labor practices.-2 The Supreme
Court's recent denial of certiorari in the Carlisle Lumber case left the em-
ployer with a liability for back pay under a Board order amounting to more
than $200,000.3 To burden an employer with payment of so large a stun in
back wages because of a statutory violation may seem, at first blush, an unduly
severe penalty. But in this particular case the unusual amount merely drama-
tizes a recurrent problem. The fairness of any award cannot properly be
appraised without a thorough consideration of the function of the back pay
order.
The back pay provision is doubtless intended, in part, to have a deterrent
function - to discourage employers from engaging in unfair labor practices
by requiring them to make good the losses which their violations of the law
have caused.4 Primarily, however, the Board is seeking a remedy for the
conditions created by unfair labor practices; that the order may involve on
the one hand punishment for the employer, or on the other, compensation
for the employee, is not in itself a motivating factor, but merely a conse-
quence incidental to the ideal of carrying out the purposes of the Act.5 Since
*The LAw joupmx is indebted to Casimir NV. Ruszkowsld of the Second Year Class
for assistance in the preparation of this Note.
1. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 (Supp. 1933). In § 1, it is declared
to be the policy of the United States to eliminate obstructions to commerce caused by
labor disputes by encouraging and protecting the practice of collective bargaining, and
guaranteeing workers full freedom of association and designation of representatives of
their own choosing.
2. Section 10(c). Upon finding an unfair labor practice, the Board is empowered,
inter alia, "... to take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees
with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act."
3. N. L. R. B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 99 F. (2d) 533 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933), cert.
denied, U. S. Sup. Ct., March 6, 1939. The order involved the largest amount ever as-
sessed against an employer for back wages. (1939) 4 L R. R. 47. As a result of formal
Board orders, 1,925 employees have been reinstated with a total of $294,201.73 paid in
back wages, not including the Carisle order. The actual number of back pay awards is
much greater, however, in view of the numerous settlements made without formal Board
proceedings. See (1939) 4 L. R. R. 55.
4. ". . . the provisions . . . were designed to insure that an employer would
cease unfair labor practices." N. L. IL B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 99 F. (2d) 533, at
537 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938). See also N. L. R. B. v. Biles Coleman Lumber Co., 93 F.
(2d) 18, at 23 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
5. The Board's own language supports this vieiv. Reinstatement and back pay
issues are discussed in the opinions under the heading "The Remedy.' See, e.g., In re
Art Crayon Co., Inc., 7 NLRB 102, 119 (1938). See also, In re Colorado Milling &
Elevator Co., 11 NLRB No. 16 (1939), and 3 A ,xuAL Rroar N LRB (1938) 199,
where such orders are described as remedial. The Supreme Court has held the Board's
power to order affirmative action "remedial", and not punitive. Consolidated Edison Co.
of N. Y., Inc., et al. v. N. L. R. B., U. S. Sup. Ct, (1938) 6 U. S. L. WN-- 425, at 429.
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the Board has not bound itself to any rigid principle in deciding what the
appropriate remedy in each case shall be, an order may jibe with neither a
punitive nor a compensatory theory. As a matter of administrative policy,
circumstances in particular cases may require making concessions and adjust-
ments subject only to a consideration of the policies of the Act. In thus
meeting the divergent situations which involve reinstatement and back pay
problems, the Board has been working out its own common law under its
broad discretionary power, and has gradually sketched the outline of its
policy in various types of cases. Each case presents three problems for
determination: the period for which back pay is to be granted; the rate and
amount of remuneration; and the method in which payment shall be made.
The first determination, ascertainment of the duration of the payment, is
least difficult where there has been an outright discriminatory discharge or
lockout of employees. An employee is then ordinarily entitled to back pay
from the date of the discrimination to the date of an offer of reinstatement0
-a result consonant with either a punitive or a compensatory theory, since
the penalty approximates the loss caused by the wrong. But this policy of
matching violation of the Act against extent of loss is not always rigidly
applied. Although strikers retain the status of employees, 7 and also may be
ordered reinstated, nevertheless, for purposes of back pay, they are placed in
a different category from discharged employees." However logically it might
be argued that one who has caused a strike through his unfair labor practices
should be required to compensate striking employees for the loss of wages
thus sustained, the Board's remedy has not gone so far, and back pay for
the strike period has regularly been refused.0 A striker, it is said, is himself
responsible for his own loss by his voluntary severance of the employment
tie. The Board therefore orders back pay only from the date of application
6. In re Martin Dyeing & Finishing Co., 2 NLRB 403 (1936); It re Jacob Cohen,
4 NLRB 720 (1937); In re Ronni Parfum, Inc., et al., 8 NLRB No. 37 (1938). In these
cases an actual discharge was found to be discriminatory. Some variation is presented
by cases in which the employer's actions are interpreted as constituting a constructive
discharge, forcing the employee to quit. Back pay is awarded in such a case from the
date the employee was compelled to leave. In re Sterling Corset Co., Inc., 9 NLRB No,
79 (1938) (nervous tension from being kept under constant surveillance caused employees
to leave); In re Harlan Fuel Co., 8 NLRB No. 3 (1938) (employee quit when lie was
transferred to work imperilling his life).
7. Included in the definition of "employee" in § 2(3) of the Act is "any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dis-
pute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular
and substantially equivalent employment . . ."
8. The distinction between discharged employees and strikers as to back pay status
is emphasized in In re Sunshine Hosiery Mills, 1 NLRB 664 (1936). Discharged em-
ployes who refused offers of reinstatement during a strike which followed the discharge,-
were held to be strikers in In re Elkland Leather Co., Inc., 8 NLRB No. 56 (1938).
Cf. In re Hemp & Co., 9 NLRB No. 41 (1938); In re Lindeman Power & Equipment
Co., 11 NLRB No. 66 (1939).
9. If a striker applies to the employer for reinstatement during or after the strilke,
and is refused, back pay is awarded from the date of such refusal, this being regarded as
a discriminatory discharge. In re American Mfg. Co., 5 NLRB 443 (1938).
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for reinstatement until an offer of re-employment is made.10 This attitude
has probably been adopted to encourage peaceful settlement of labor strife,2'
for although the punitive aspect of such a back pay award might have a
strong deterrent effect on future unfair labor practices, its compensatory flavor
would tend to stimulate resort to strikes in labor disputes, rather than to the
legal machinery provided by the Statute.
Some cases in which the length of the back pay period is at issue raise the
question of whether the Board must be controlled in determining its remedy
by such equitable doctrines as laches, estoppel, or minimization of damages.
In spite of the frequent assertion that these rules apply only in suits between
private litigants,12 the Board often appears to be influenced by considerations
of an equitable nature in determining the time from which back pay is to
run. Factors of delay for which the employer is not responsible may in some
cases be regarded as justifying a departure from the usual rule of ascertaining
duration of the period. If, for example, a discharged employee or the union
acting in his behalf is dilatory in filing charges 13 or a case is reopened after
having been withdrawn or closed for a considerable time,14 the period of
inaction is excluded from the back pay coverage.'5 In addition to these con-
siderations of delay, mitigating circumstances of reliance and good faith may
influence a variation in result.. The employer's assumed reliance upon an
10. In re Sunshine Hosiery Mills, I NLRB 664 (1936). Under the holding in more
recent cases, the period begins five days after the application for reinstatement. In re
Tiny Town Togs, 7 NLRB 54 (1938).
11. See note 1, supra. The Board points with pride to the reduction in the number
of strikes as compared to the increased number of cases which have been brought under
the Act. 3 ANNUAL RrPoar NLRB (1938) 1-3. See also Address by J. Warren Madden,
Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board, in (1939) 3 L. L. R. 670; Larson,
The Labor Relations Acts-Their Effect on Industrial Warfare (1938) 36 1M1cn. L. RMy.
1237, at 1264.
12. In re Colorado Milling & Elevator Co., 11 NLRB No. 16 (1939) (laches); In re
Shenandoah Dives Mining Co., 11 NLRB No. 67 (1939) (estoppel); N.L.R.B. v.
Carlisle Lumber Co., 99 F. (2d) 533 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) (minimization of damages,
"clean hands") ; N. L. R. B. v. Hearst et al., 4 L. IL R. 166 (C. C A. 9th, 1939) ("clean
hands").
13. Delays of 19 and 11 months from the time of discharge to the time of filing
charges were held unreasonable in In re Inland Lime & Stone Co., S NLRB No. 116
(1938), and back pay was granted only from the time of filing. In In re Crowe Coal
Co., 9 NLRB No. 100 (1938), a union did not file charges until 6 months after its
efforts to obtain reinstatement for discharged workers had been rejected. Back pay was
awarded from the date of discharge to the date of the last conference between union
and employes, and from the date of filing charges to an offer of reinstatement.
14. In re C. G. Conn, Ltd., 10 NLRB No. 38 (1938) (case reinstated 2 years after
union's withdrawal); In re Kentucky Firebrick Co., 3 NLRB 455 (1937) and In re
Whiterock Quarries, Inc., 5 NLRB 601 (1938) (cases closed after Intermediate Report
were reopened a year later).
15. A nine month delay after a case was transferred to the Board was held to justify
exclusion of that period. In re Cherry Cotton Mills, 4 NLRB 731 (1937), 93 F. (2d)
444 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938). But cf. In re Colorado Milling & Elevator Co., 11 NLRB
No. 16 (1939), in which the Board denied the applicability of a doctrine of laches to its
proceedings, and granted back pay for the three-year period during which the case had
been pending.
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opinion of the Trial Examiner adverse to the employee will cause exclusion
of the interval between the time of this ruling and a later reversal by the
Board, the belief being that the employer could not have been expected to
reinstate the employee after the Trial Examiner's report." Apparently,
however, permissible reliance includes only continued inaction; for if the
employer relies on the Trial Examiner's erroneous finding of no jurisdiction
in order to make further discriminatory discharges, no time deduction will
be granted.17 In another type of case, the employer may be absolved from a
liability for back wages if he has relied in good faith on an interpretation of
a contract. Thus where an employer discharged employees under the errone-
ous belief that the terms of a closed shop agreement required their dismissals,
he was relieved of the duty of paying any back wages for the entire period
prior to the Board's decision.18 This good faith exception reflects a punitive
rather than a compensatory approach, for even though the employer's error
and technical violation of the Act caused a loss to his employees, the Board
refuses to penalize him since he had no intention of wrongdoing.10 In the
other examples of leniency, however, the employer's guilt in wrongfully vio-
lating the Act was in no way diminished by the fact that the charge against
him was delayed, or final settlement of a case postponed, or that the Trial
Examiner made an erroneous ruling. But the.Board has apparently considered
a concession to the employer in these cases as entirely justified,20 however
incompatible with punitive or compensatory principles it may appear to be.
16. In re E. R. Haffelfinger Co., 1 NLRB 760 (1936); In re Williams Coal Co. et
al., 11 NLRB No. 49 (1939). Back wages are awarded from the date of discrimination
to the date of the Intermediate Report, and from the date of the Board's decision until
an offer of reinstatement. On compensatory principles, the result in some cases seems
unfair. Thus in I; re The Grace Co., 7 NLRB 766 (1938), one employee received a
smaller award than the others because the Trial Examiner's ruling had been incorrect
only as to her.
17. In In re American Potash & Chemical Corp., 3 NLRB 140 (1937), [order en.
forced, 98 F. (2d) 488 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938), cert. denied, U. S. Sup. Ct., Feb. 27, 1939]
the Trial Examiner's finding that there had been unfair labor practices but that the
Board did not have jurisdiction was followed by wholesale discriminatory discharges.
The Board refused to grant the usual deduction for the period between the Intermediate
Report and the Board decision, attempting to distinguish the case from those il which
no unfair labor practices were found by the Trial Examiner. The distinction is not borne
out in other cases. See, e.g., In re Kentucky Firebrick Co., 3 NLRB 455 (1937) ; In re
Whiterock Quarries, Inc., 5 NLRB 601 (1938).
18. it re M. & M. Woodworking Co., 6 NLRB 372 (1938), order set aside, 4 L. R.
R. 35 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939), (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1059; In re Smith Wood Products,
Inc., 7 NLRB 950 (1938).
19. The case in favor of the employer was particularly strong in In re M. & M.
Woodworking Co., 6 NLRB 372 (1938), where a court decision had sustained the con-
struction of the contract on which the employer relied. The Board's order was set aside
by the Circuit Court of Appeals on the ground that there was no unfair labor practice,
(1939) 4 L. R. R. 35, (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1059.
20. That the good will of employers is regarded as important to the effective admin-
istration of the Act, see In re Shenandoah-Dives Mining Co., 11 NLRB No. 67 (1939),
in which the Board dismissed charges against an employer who relied on a compromise
agreement participated in by an agent of the Board.
In determining the back pay period, the Board may also take into account
the economic condition of the employer and of the industry in which he is
engaged, although once the period for payment and the amount owed is found,
hardship in performance of an order is of no consequence.2 ' If it can be
shown that valid business reasons would have required a shutdown of the
plant 22 or a discharge of certain employees 2 3 even if no unfair labor practices
had occurred, then the employee is allowed back pay only for the period
during which he would have held his job had there been no discrimination.24
Such matters seem to be decided, however, merely as questions of fact the
determination of which is necessary in order to discover what conditions call
for remedial treatment, rather than under any guiding equitable principle in
the employer's favor. The remedy granted makes the employee whole only
for the loss occasioned by the unfair labor practices mad relieves the employer
of responsibility for loss caused by economic factors beyond his control.
The back pay period usually ends with an offer of reinstatement pursuant
to Board order.25 But back pay awards are not always accompanied by an
order of reinstatement. If the employee discriminated against has obtained
substantially equivalent employment elsewhere,20 or indicates that he does
not desire re-emplovment,27 it has been the practice to allow him back pay
for the period of enforced idleness attributable to the employer's unfair labor
practice, the period in these cases dosing when the other employment is
obtained or when the old employment is refused. The Board never seems to
have questioned its authority to grant such an order, for, just as in other
cases, the employer is required to pay for no more than the deprivation caused
by his unlawful act. This practice has recently been faintly tinged with doubt
by a dictim in the Carlisle Lumber case28 that reinstatement is a condition
precedent to a back pay award. In pointing to this surprising result, the
Circuit Court of Appeals first adopts the view of the Moorseville case,2 that
since the power to reinstate in Section 10(c) extends only to "employees,"
a person who has obtained regular and substantially equivalent employment
21. Cf. N. L. R. B. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 97 F. (2d) 195 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
22. In In re Regal Shirt Co., 4 NLRB 567 (1937), there were two shutdowns, the
first motivated by union discrimination, and the second by legitimate business reasons.
Employees were allowed back pay from the date of the first shutdown to the date of
the temporary reopening of the plant.
23. In re Frederick R. Barrett, 3 NLRB 513 (1937); In re Benjamin Levine, 6
NLRB 400 (1938).
24. If it is impossible to determine from the evidence when a shutdow-n would have
been necessary for business reasons, back pay will be refused. In re Leo L. Lowy, 3
NLRB 938 (1937); cf. In re Phillips Granite Co., 11 NLRB No. 72 (1939).
25. Or with placement on a preferential hiring list. In re Williams Coal Co. cf at.,
11 NLRB No. 49 (1939).
26. In re Highiay Trailer Co., 3 NLRB 591 (1937), order enforced, 95 F. (2d)
1012 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938) ; In re Empire Furniture Corp., 10 NLRB No. 92 (1939).
27. In re Williams M1ffg. Co., 6 NLRB 135 (1938).
28. N. L. R. B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 99 F. (2d) 533, 537 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933),
cert. denied, U. S. Sup. Ct, March 6, 1939. In N. L. R. B. v. Hearst et al., 4 L. R. R.
166 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939), the same court allowed payment of back wages to personal
representative of employee who died after Board order and before reinstatement.
29. Mooresville Cotton Mills v. N. L. R. B., 97 F. (2d) 959 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933).
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cannot be reinsti.ted, for he is not within the definition of "employee" in
Section 2(3). But the Mooresville decision had held that even though rein-
statement was not possible, a back pay award, justly deserved by the employee,
was properly within the terms and policy of the Act.30 The Court in the
Carlisle Lumber case attempts to justify its position on the ground that a
back pay provision is punitive, not compensatory; but the opinion does not
explain why this theory, even if assumed to be correct, 31 should preclude an
award of back pay without reinstatement. Indeed, the denial of back pay
under such circumstances seems to penalize the employee for his diligence
and good fortune in obtaining other employment.8 2 Since the practical effect
of requiring a forfeiture of back pay otherwise deserved may be to discourage
the employee's efforts to seek other work, the rule in the Mooresville case
seems decidedly more desirable. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's language
in the Fansteel case lends persuasive force to an argument that the back
pay remedy finds its source not in the specific power to order reinstatement
but in the broad power to take affirmative action.33
Having determined the period for which back pay will be granted, the
Board's next problem is to establish the rate and amount of payment. In
working out this part of the remedy, the attempt is made to allow the em-
ployee as nearly as possible the amount he would have received had there
been no discrimination on the employer's part. Normally the wage rate as
of the time of discharge is used as a basis of computation; but if a wage
increase or reduction has been effected since that time, a readjustment in
accordance with the new rate is ordered.34 In cases where this ordinary
method of estimation is not feasible or will not approximate what the em-
ployee would actually have received, other rules are devised. 85 Thus where
irregular working hours or piece work are involved, the Board will compute
back payments on the basis of an average weekly or hourly earning over a
30. Id. at 963.
31. In the view of the United States Supreme Court, this theory is not correct.
Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y., Inc., et al. v. N. L. R. B., U. S. Sup. Ct., (1938) 6
U. S. L. WEEK 425, at 429; N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., U. S. Sup. Ct.,
(1939) 6 U. S. L. WEEK 896, at 899.
32. Some escape from the effect of the Carlisle dictum may be found in a strict con-
struction of what is "regular and substantially equivalent employment." This ,is sug-
gested by the Court itself when it says that these words involve a consideration of type
of work, rate of pay, hours, working conditions and seniority rights. See N. L. R. B. v.
Carlisle Lumber Co., 99 F. (2d) 533, at 539 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) ; cf. It re L. C. Smith
& Corona Typewriters, Inc., 11 NLRB No. 123 (1939).
33. N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., U. S. Sup. Ct. (1939) 6 U. S. L.
WEEK 896, at 899.
34. In re Hardwick Stove Co., Inc., 2 NLRB 78 (1936); In re Washington Mfg.
Co., 4 NLRB 970 (1938) ; In re The Grace Co., 7 NLRB 766 (1938) ; it re Lone Star
Bag & Bagging Co., 8 NLRB No. 30 (1938).
35. In In re Acme Air Appliance Co., Inc., 10 NLRB No. 123 (1939), where a
discriminatory delay in rehiring strikers was found, the amount payable to each was
determined by taking the total amount earned by 8 new employees hired during this
period and dividing it equally among the 8 strikers.
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specified period prior to the discrimination 8 or on the basis of amounts
earned by other employees during the period of discriminationP, In other
cases the payment will also include extra compensation normally earned
through tips 38 or bonuses, 0 and the reasonable value of special services and
facilities supplied by the employer. 40
Although the Board's remedial ideal in these cases seems to be to com-
pensate the employee as fully as possible for the deprivation suffered, it has
shown equal solicitude in preventing him from profiting by his unemploy-
ment. To this end, every order contains a provision for deduction of amounts
earned elsewhere during the period specified for back pay. 1 However, several
qualifications have been imposed upon this rule. In the first place, earnings
of an extra-curricular nature are not required to be accounted for; only those
amounts earned during hours that would otherwise have been spent working
for the employer in question may be deducted.4V 2 Further, any deduction is
in terms of a net amount, because it is recognized that since the effort to
obtain the other position may entail transportation and lodging expenses that
would not otherwise have been undertaken, alloiwance 43 should be made for
these items in determining the amount to be deducted.44 Still another im-
portant limitation on the usual rule of deduction is made where work relief,
job insurance payments, or strike benefits have been received. At first, none
of these payments were deductible as earnings.u The lack of correlation thus
36. In re Harry G. Beck, 3 NLRB 110 (1937) (eight weeks); In re The Grace Co.,
7 NLRB 766 (1938) (two weeks). In In re Harlan Fuel Co., 8 NLRB No. 3 (1933),
the employer's discrimination as to working conditions caused a severe reduction in the
tonnage production of certain employees. The Board determined tonnage loss by sub-
tracting the amounts earned during the period of discrimination from the amounts
earned over a six-months period prior to the discrimination.
37. In re Clark & Reid Co., Inc., 2 NLRB 516 (1936); In re Sterling Corset Co.,
Inc., et al., 9 NLRB No. 79 (1938).
38. In re Club Troika, 2 NLRB 90 (1936); In re Willard, Inc., 2 NLRB 1094
(1937), order enforced, N. L. R. B. v. Willard, Inc., 98 F. (2d) 244 (App. D. C.
1938).
39. In re Central Truck Lines, Inc., 3 NLRB 317 (1937).
40. In re Bell Oil & Gas Co., 2 NLRB 577 (1937), order set aside, N. L. R. B. v.
Bell Oil & Gas Co., 98 F. (2d) 406 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) (fair value of heating and
light); In re National Weaving Co., Inc., 7 NLRB 743 (1938) (rent, water, and elec-
tricity at rate paid when employed).
41. See, e.g., the orders in In re National Casket Co., Inc., 1 NLRB 90 (1935);
In re Hardwick Stove Co., Inc., 2 NLRB 78 (1936).
42. In re Pusey, faynes & Breish Co., 1 NLRB 482 (1936) ; In re National Motor
Bearing Co., 5 NLRB 409 (1938).
43. But the employer has never been held liable for expenses incurred by the em-
ployee if the latter's search for employment is unsuccessful.
44. In re Crossett Lumber Co., 8 NLRB No. 51 (1938); In re Crescent Bed Co.,
Inc., 9 NLRB No. 39 (1938). The Board has not indicated to vhat type of epense
it will limit these allowances. The order in In re Mount Vernon Car Mfg. Co., 11 NLRB
No. 46 (1939), included a credit for laundry as well as for transportation, room, and
board.
45. In re Vegetable Oil Products Co., Inc., 5 NLRB 52 (1938); In re Sterling
Corset Co., Inc., et at., 9 NLRB No. 79 (1938). But cf. In re Associated Press, 1 NLRB
788 (1936) (fV. P. A. wages of one in managerial position held deductible).
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resulting between the amount which the employer had to pay and the actual
loss sustained by the employee seemed to point toward a punitive, instead of
compensatory, exercise of the Board's power to order back pay. A more
equitable result appears to have been reached in the modification adopted
for work relief payments. These are now held deductible from the amount
to be paid the employee; but the sum deducted, instead of being retained by
the employer, is paid over to the fiscal agency of the government which sup-
plied the relief funds. 46 But no modification of the rule has as yet been
made in regard to strike benefits or job insurance payments. 47 This is perhaps
justifiable when, as in the case of strike benefits, payments are made from
a fund to which the employee has himself contributed.
The period for payment and the manner of computation once having been
determined, the method of making disbursement presents no difficulty. Or-
dinarily the Board will merely order the employer to recompense the desig-
nated employees in accordance with instructions. Though there was earlier
intimation to the contrary,48 it is now apparently settled, at least in one of
the circuits in which the question arose, that the Board need not specify in
its order the names of employees to whom payments are to be made or the
exact amounts due.49 In the absence of such specification, the Board may
supervise, subsequent to its order, the determination of recipients and the
amounts payableY0 It is becoming a more frequent practice, however, to
settle these matters by a stipulation of the parties on which, if the Board
approves, an order is entered.r' The increase in the number of orders on
stipulation in recent months indicates a trend which will permit speedier
distribution in many cases, since any necessity for further hearing in regard
to amounts due will be obviated.52
The precise limits of the Board's power to order back pay are as yet
undefined. Under the Statute itself, the only limitation is one of purpose:
to effectuate the policies of the ActY3 The power to award back pay is of
course indirectly curtailed when, in certain instances, the Board's authority
46. In re Republic Steel Corp., 9 NLRB No. 33 (1938) ; In re Union Drawn Steel
Co., et al., 10 NLRB No. 76 (1938).
47. In re Missouri-Arkansas Coach Lines, Inc., 7 NLRB 186 (1938).
48. Agwvilines, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 87 F. (2d) 146 (C. C. A. 5th. 1936) ; N. L. R. B.
v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 91 F. (2d) 458 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937), rced, 303 U. S.
272 (1938); N. L. R. B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 94 F. (2d) 138 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937),
cert. denied, 304 U. S. 575 (1938).
49. N. L. R. B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 99 F. (2d) 533 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938), ecrt.
denied, U. S. Sup. Ct., March 6, 1939.
50. In re United Aircraft Mfg. Co., Inc., 1 NLRB 236 (1936); In re Haffelfinger
Co., Inc., 1 NLRB 760 (1936).
51. It re National Tea Co., 9 NLRB No. 25 (1938). The fact that individual em-
ployees object to a stipulation made between the employer, the union which filed charges,
and counsel for the Board will not prevent approval and entry of an order by the Board.
In re Champion Paper & Fibre Co., 10 NLRB No. 64 (1938).
52. Such orders have been numerous since the summer of 1938. They often provide
for the deposit of a certain sum with the Regional Director, to be distributed in settle-
ment of back pay. See, e.g., In re Breeze Corporations, Inc., 10 NLRB No. 105 (1939).
53. See note 1, supra.
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to reinstate is denied,54 for in most cases the two orders are concomitant.
However, the foregoing discussion has been concerned not with the propriety
of reinstatement, but only with the Board's administration of the back pay
provision when reinstatement is deserved. Within the framework of the
provision, the Board has thus far had a fairly free hand in working out the
rules by which it determines the back pay coverage and method of computa-
tion in each case. Its temperate treatment of these perplexing problems has
eminently justified this broad range of discretion.
EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF PROBATE COURTS AND FINALITY
OF PROBATE DECREES*
PROMPTED by the desire to effectuate swift settlement of decedents' estates
and to insure certainty of title in the new owners of the estate property,
constant efforts have been made to increase the finality afforded decrees of
probate courts.' Probate courts have been labeled courts of record the judg-
ments of which are entitled to presumptions of regularity and may not be
collaterally attacked. 2 In states recognizing probate in common form, statutes
provide that after a limited period for contesta probate is forever final.4
Accordingly, even where a fraud or forgery that would have defeated probate
of the will is discovered after the statutory period for contest, equity is barred
from either setting aside probate or imposing a constructive trust upon the
54. N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., U. S. Sup. Ct. (1939) 6 U. S. L.
WEEK 896; N. L. R. B. v. Sands Mlfg. Co., U. S. Sup. Ct. (1939) 6 U. S. L INTEEK 937.
* Holland v. Bradley, 118 S. AV. (2d) 262 (Ark. 1938).
1. For the meaning of "probate," see ATKINSON, WILLs (1937) 426; Vo:Rtm,
AMmc.Aw LAW OF AD- misTRATiox (3d ed. 1923) 492, 701, 774.
2. Graham v. Graham, 175 Ark. 530, 1 S. W. (2d) 16 (1927) ; Reitz v. Smith, S6
Ohio App. 72, 10 N. E. (2d) 150 (1937); see WomER, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 145;
Bartlett, Some Problems in Probate Jurisdiction (1936) 5 J. B. A. K, .. 143; (1936)
50 HARv. L. REv. 367.
3. There is no uniformity in methods of contest, even among states recognizing
probate in common form. See ATKINsox, op. cit. supra note 1, at §§ 174-185; Wozn:rm,
op. cit. supra note 1, at §§215-217; Carey, Jurisdiction Over Decedents' Estates (1929)
24 ILL. L. R v. 44. In some jurisdictions provision is made for probate in solemn form
only. E.g., N. Y. SuRnoaArEs' CoURT Acr (Gilbert-Bliss, 1937) §§ 40, 48-51; Co:;:.. Gmnr.
STAT. (1930) §§ 4766, 4884. But here no time limitation is placed upon the right to pro-
bate. ATisoN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 434.
4. The Ohio statute is typical. OHIo GEx. CODE Ax.. (Page, 1933) § 10504-32.
The stipulated period in the majority of states is six months to one year, but in a few
states is as long as seven years.
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beneficiaries of the probated will,5 frequently upon a res judicala rationale.0
But wherever a limitation exists upon the jurisdiction of a probate court,
there is a corresponding loophole in the conclusiveness of its decree. 7 While
there has been a tendency, varying in extent from state to state, to concentrate
in a single court the duties of probating wills and the administration and
settlement of decedents' estates,8 this development in the great majority of
states has not reached the point where general equitable jurisdiction has been
granted the probate courts. Where, therefore, the probate court cannot render
adequate relief, equity must be called upon to lend assistance.
In two analogous situations the equitable remedial device of the constructive
trust has been generally granted. Where a beneficiary under a will induces
the gift by an express or implied parol promise to the decedent to effectuate
a certain distribution of the property given, a trust is imposed if the promise
is not performed, whether or not the contest period has passed.9 If these
facts were raised on contest, the majority of probate courts, empowered only
to accept or reject wills, would be unable to render requisite relief.10 Since
in most cases intestacy would not accomplish the same result as performance
of the promise, the equitable remedy of impressing a trust is desirable in
order to effectuate the testator's intentions. Likewise, in the situation where
5. Sumner v. Staton, 151 N. C. 198, 65 S. E. 902 (1909) ; Reeves v. Bridges, 193
Ark. 292, 99 S. V. (2d) 242 (1936); see PAGE, TuE LAW OF WILLS (2d ed. 192o)
§ 532; Warren, Fraud, Undue Influence and Mistake in Wills (1928) 41 HiARv. L. RLv.
309. A distinction is made between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, the latter being fraud
in obtaining the will while the former is fraud in obtaining probate. Equity isl not
barred from lending assistance where extrinsic fraud is involved. Seeds v. Seeds, 116
Ohio St. 144, 156 N. E. 193 (1927) (suppression of notice of probate) ; cf. Ferguson v.
Wachs, 96 F. (2d) 910 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938); see Stansell, The Power of a Court of
Equity to Give Relief from Decrees of the Probate Court (1935) 13 CIII.-KENT Ray. 91.
6. E.g., Case of Broderick's Will, 88 U. S. 503 (1874) ; see Note (1928) 52 A. L.
R. 779. Some courts have allowed a tort action in this situation, holding that it is not a
collateral attack upon probate because it in no way contravenes the policies fostering
probate finality. See, generally, Vanneman, The Constructive Trust: A Neglected
Remedy in Ohio (1936) 10 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 366; (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 1203; (1935)
48 HAgv. L. REv. 984.
The use of the concept of res judicata is especially unfortunate in situations where tile
statutory period has passed without contest. The bar is not a prior adjudication, but
merely a perfunctory registration of a will followed by the lapse of the contest period,
conclusive only because of statutory declaration. Cf. note 13, infra.
7. See ATIKiNsoN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 225; (1931) 31 COL. L. Rav. 1203.
8. See WOERNER, op. cit. supra note 1, at §§ 140-141.
9. Before lapse of contest period: Shrader's Ex'r v. Shrader, 228 Ky. 374, 15 S. V.
(2d) 246 (1929) ; Merrill v. Pardun, 125 Neb. 701, 251 N. W. 834 (1933). After conl-
test period: Winder v. Scholey, 83 Ohio St. 204, 93 N. E. 1098 (1910); Garland v.
Higgins, 160 Tenn. 381, 25 S. W. (2d) 583 (1930). See Note (1930) 66 A. L. R. 156;
Scott, Conveyances Upon Trusts Not Properly Declared (1924) 37 HARv. L. Rav. 653;
Vanneman, supra note 6, at 379 et seq. A trust is also generally imposed where an heir
has persuaded decedent by an oral promise to refrain from executing a will. Ransdel v.
Moore, 153 Ind. 393, 53 N. E. 767 (1899); Mead v. Robertson, 131 Mo. App. 185, 110
S. W. 1095 (1908) ; see Costigan, Constructive Trusts Based on Promises Made to Se-
cure Bequests, Devises or Intestate Succession (1915) 28 HARV. L. Rav. 237, 366.
10. See Warren, supra note 5, at 323.
probate of a prior will cannot be contested in the probate court, in spite of
the testator's attempt to make a later will, a constructive trust is generally
imposed. Such a situation would arise if the beneficiaries under the later
will were unable to show sufficient interest to contest"1 because of the destruc-
tion of that will or because its execution was fraudulently prevented. 22 Since
in these cases the majority of probate courts furnishes no adequate remedy,
the bars to equitable interference are not raised. Statutory declarations of the
finality of probate are not enforced and the concept of res judicata is not
applied.' 3
A recent case raised the question of trust imposition within a novel situa-
tion. A testator bequeathed all his property to one nephew. Probate of the will
was contested by nieces and other nephews on the ground that the testator
had been unduly and fraudulently influenced in making the will by the sole
legatee's assurance that he would carry out the testator's design to distribute
the estate among the nephews and nieces according to the descent and distri-
bution statute. Judgment was entered by the circuit court on probate appeal
upholding the will. Meanwhile, the contestants filed a complaint in chancery
court alleging the same facts and seeking the imposition of a constructive
trust upon the sole legatee and administrator of the estate. The Supreme
Court of Arkansas, in affirming the dismissal of the complaint, held that the
circuit court's judgment upholding the will barred the suit in equity. The
court relied upon the joint doctrines of res judicala and election of remedies,
resting the decision, with some ambiguity, partly on each ground. 14
The result of the instant case can be deemed desirable only upon the
assumption that the contestants' claim was completely speculative. The
rationale upon which the court based its decision, however, appears unjust-
ifiable. The sole issue at contest was whether the will was validly executed,
and probate could have been denied only if it had been proved that the
promisee at the time the promise was made did not intend to fulfill his
agreement. No such intent was found at contest by either jury or court,
since the validity of the will was upheld. Yet notvithstanding the valid
execution of the will, the promise may in fact have been made and have been
breached without the initial fraudulent intent. To void the will in this situa-
tion would be doctrinally impossible because of valid execution and func-
tionally undesirable because it would generally defeat the testator's intentions.
Therefore a constructive trust furnishes the contestants with their only avail-
able remedy. This issue is cognizable only in a court of equity in the par-
ticular jurisdiction where the instant case was decided.25 The fact that suc-
11. See ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 188; (1979) 3 U. oF Cur. L. R .107.
12. Gaines v. Chew, 43 U. S. 619 (1844); Thomas v. Briggs, 98 Ind. App. 352, 189
N. E. 389 (1934) ; see Note (1935) 98 A. L. R. 474; Scott, supra note 9, at 6553; WVar-
ren, supra note 5, at 309.
13. See Garland v. Higgins, 160 Tenn. 381, 388, 25 S. NN. (2d) 583, 585 (1930);
Brazil v. Silva, 181 Cal. 490, 493, 185 Pac. 174, 175 (1919).
14. Holland v. Bradley, 118 S. AV. (2d) 262 (Ark. 1938). The majority opinion does
not specifically use the term "res judicata," but from the dissenting opinion it is apparent
that the defense in equity was a plea of res judicata.
15. See note 28, in fra.
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cessful contest would have earned the contestants their intestate shares1"
and the imposition of a trust pursuant to the alleged promise would have
brought the claimants the same shares neither alters the different issues
before probate and equity courts, nor expands the limited jurisdiction of
the probate court. In adopting the terminology of res judicata, therefore,
the court established a dangerous precedent- barring equitable enforcement
of an oral promise or a spoliated will by any beneficiary who had unsuccess-
fully contested the will. 17 Nor should the instant decision have been rested
on the doctrine of election of remedies. It is an unfortunate concept to intro-
duce into an already confused field ;18 and the prerequisite for its application
- that the same evidence should satisfy the requirements for either of the
alternative remedies-is not satisfied in this situation.19
The real reason for this conceptual confusion does not lie in a choice of
arguments, however, but rather in the fact that the restricted jurisdiction of
the majority of probate courts is insufficient to settle decedents' estates
without aid from other courts. The grant of equitable powers to the probate
courts would eradicate the present confusion. Although probate jurisdiction
is entirely dependent upon statutes which resemble one another only in broad
outline, there may be detected a slight'trend in the desired direction. State
probate practice is of two general types, the one found in those jurisdictions
where probate matters are part of the business of the established courts, 0
the other in those states where separate and independent courts are estab-
lished.21 In the first category, the courts of fourteen jurisdictions have general
equity powers,22 but, when acting as probate courts, they may employ those
general powers in only three states.23 In the others, when equitable relief
16. There being no prior will, intestacy would have followed a successful contest.
17. Carried to its extreme this result might possibly bar a beneficiary under an oral
promise or a spoliated will from equitable aid even where the statutory period passed
without contest.
18. See Hine, Election of Remedies, A Criticism (1913) 26 HARV. L. Rmv. 707;
Rothschild, A Remedy for Election of Remedies (1929) 14 CORN. L. Q, 141,
19. See Comment (1938) 38 CoL L. Rzv. 292. Generally the doctrine of election of
remedies does not bar an assertion of a claim against the estate after the claimant has
contested the will. Spencer v. Spencer, 25 R. I. 239, 55 Atl. 637 (1903); Hubbard v.
Ball, 81 P. (2d) 73 (Idaho 1938); cf. Stamp v. Banninga, 221 Mich. 268, 191 N. W.
25 (1922).
20. Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wyoming and the District of Columbia.
21. Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Vermont and Wisconsin.
But some of these jurisdictions make provision for a trial de novo in a higher court,
e.g., CoNr. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 4990; Cf. WOERNER, op. cit. supra note 1 at § 550.
22. Arizona, California, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada,
North Carolina, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia.
23. Ex parte Crandall, 52 F. (2d) 650 (S. D. Ind. 1931) ; In re Agee's Estate, 69
Utah 130, 252 Pac. 891 (1927) ; In re Krause's Estate, 173 Wash. 1, 21 P. (2d) 268
(1933).
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is necessary, a new action must be started, addressed to the same court
sitting as an equity rather than a probate court, a procedure which appears
to be unnecessary and time-consuming.2 4 Where probate jurisdiction is
given to established courts which have no general equity powers,2 limited
"equitable principles" may be applied in some states.2 0 Similar variation
exists in the states which have separate probate courts. Eight apparently
allow the probate courts no equitable powers.2 7 Ten adhere to the vague
abstraction that although the courts have no general equity jurisdiction,
equitable principles may be applied.28 Uncertain as this proposition is, at
least it is clear that within the confines of the rule the power to impress a
trust cannot be discovered.2 9 Only six states in this group expressly bestow
plenary equity powers upon the probate courts. The Mlaine and 'Massachusetts
statutes grant equitable jurisdiction concurrent with that of the supreme
judicial and superior courts in all matters relating to estate administration,-"
24. E.g., In re Silva's Estate, 169 Cal. 116, 145 Pac. 1015 (1915); In re Skinner's
Estate, 215 Iowa 1021, 247 N. IV. 484 (1933); Poston v. Delfelder, 39 Wyo. 163, 270
Pac. 1068 (1928) (specific performance granted by district court sitting as probate
court only where specific statutory authorization).
25. CoLo. ANN. STAT. (Mfills, 1930) § 1650; F. Coup. GE:.. LAtws ANN-. (Shill-
man, 1927) § 5183; Ky. STAT. ANN. (Carroll, 1936) § 1057; XM. Com!r. Sr, T. (1929)
§27-502; N. D. Comp. LAWs ANN.. (1913) §8929; Oi-LA. ST,%T. (Harlow, 1931) §3951;
Oaa- CoNsT. art. VII, § 12; S. D. Comp. LAws (1929) §§ 2118-2119; T s. Coau ANN.
(Williams, 1934) §§ 10225-10232; Ta-x. CoNsT. art. V, § 16; AN. VA. Cor- AiNi:. (Michie,
1937) § 357. In some of the foregoing states these courts have equitable powers of an
extremely limited nature. McLaughlin v. Rote, 62 Colo. 505, 163 Pac. 341 (1917) ; First
Nat Bank of St Petersburg v. MacDonald, 100 Fla. 675, 130 So. 596 (1930). Instead
of granting general equitable jurisdiction some states have attempted to facilitate estate
administration by allowing probate courts to exercise the equitable remedy of specific
performance. Fox v. Fox, 57 N. D. 368, 221 N. W. SS9 (192s); Poston v. Delfelder,
39 Wyo. 163, 270 Pac. 106S (1928); see Pomar-ov, SPFCIFIC Pmaxronmc (3d ed. 1926)
§ 497.
26. Fox v. Fox, 57 N. D. 368, 221 N. IV. 889 (192); Its re Frerichs! Estate, 120
Neb. 462, 233 N. XV. 456 (1930).
27. In re Blacdinton's Estate, 29 Idaho 310, 158 Pac. 492 (1916); In re Hedin's
Estate, 140 Kan. 329, 36 P. (2d) 1006 (1934); Beckwith v. McAlister, 165 S. C. 1,
162 S. E. 623 (1932). It appears that the question in Delaware, Georgia and New Hamp-
shire has not been definitely raised, while authority in New Mexico and Rhode Island
is of questionable weight. Perea v. Barela, 6 N. M. 239, 27 Pac. 507 (1891); Hall V.
Anthony, 13 R. I. 221 (1881).
28. Courson v. Tollison, 226 Ala. 530, 147 So. 635 (1933); Arkansas Valley Trust
Co. v. Young, 128 Ark. 42, 195 S. IV. 36 (1917); Howard v. Svift, 356 11. 80, 190
N. E. 102 (1934) ; Redwood v. Howison, 129 Md. 577, 99 AtL. 83 (1917) ; In re Cox's
Estate, 284 Mich. 628, 279 N. IV. 913 (1938); State ex rel. Union Nat. Bank v. Probate
Court of Ramsey County, 103 Mlin. 325, 115 N. W. 173 (190) ; State ex rel. Kemp v.
Arnold, 113 S. 1V. (2d) 143 (Mo. App. 1938); Easton v. Goodwin, 119 X. J. Eq. 114,
181 Ad. 275 (Ch. 1935); Miller v. Fulton, 206 Pa. 595, 56 At. 74 (1903); Mathews v.
Drew, 106 Vt 245, 172 At. 638 (1934).
29. Graham v. Birch, 47 Minn. 171, 49 N. ,V. 697 (1891); In re Glover, 127 Mo.
153, 29 S. IV. 982 (1395) ; State Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 81 P. (2d) 481 (Cal. App.
1938) ; see Gifford, Will or No Will? (1920) 20 COL. L. Ra,. 862.
30. E. R2.Ev. STAT. (1930) c. 75, § 2; AfAss. ANrN. LAws (1932) c. 215, § 6.
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the latter statute specifically providing for the imposition of constructive
trusts.3 ' In New York and Ohio, the probate courts have been given plenary
equity jurisdiction of the widest scope.3 2 In two other states, the courts
have construed the statutory grants of jurisdiction to probate courts to include
full equitable powers.
3 3
It appears, then, that the probate courts of nine states have equity powers
that permit, for example, the imposition of trusts. This removal of the
disability of the probate courts to render adequate relief in all situations
makes possible the attainment of the goal underlying and inducing probate
finality. All questions involved in the administration of an estate can be
determined by the same court and a more expeditious and convenient settle-
ment can be achieved without the delays of filing new pleadings and awaiting
trial of new and separate actions. 34 And the confusion exemplified in the
principal case as to what effect should be given to the probate court's decree
disappears. To be sure, the feasibility of granting equitable jurisdiction to
all probate courts must not be considered solely from the litigant's point
of view. While the ideal system would appear to be an independent court
with competent judges and full powers, legal and equitable, the financial
burden and limited geographical range of such courts may prevent their
maintenance in localities of relatively small population where probate work
is not great and is often administered by clerks and laymen.85 But even
31. The remedy must be one available in equity. Mitchell v. Weaver, 242 Mas.
331, 136 N. E. 166 (1922) (equitable replevin) Jones v. Jones, 7 N. E. (2d) 1015 (Mass.
1937) (constructive trust). The relief sought must be incidental to the administration of
the decedent's estate before the court. Black v. Abercrombie, 267 Mass. 316, 166 N. H.
836 (1929) ; Russell v. Shapleigh, 275 Mass. 15, 175 N. E. 100 (1931).
32. SURROGATES' COURT ACT (Gilbert-Bliss, 1937) § 40; Omo GEN. Coon ANN.
(Page, 1938) § 10501-53. In New York the surrogates were given plenary equity powers
in 1921. In re Pulitzer's Estate, 139 Misc. 575, 249 N. Y. Supp. 87 (Surr. Ct. 1931);
see Coster, The Equitable Jurisdiction of Surrogates' Court in New York (1936) 10 Sr.
JOHN'S L. Rav. 199; Wingate, The Surrogates' Court of the State of New York (1933)
2 BRooKLYN L. REv. 165. These powers definitely permit trust imposition. In re Me-
Ardle's Estate, 140 Misc. 257, 250 N. Y. Supp. 276 (Surr. Ct. 1931); In re Van Mtuf-
fling's Estate, 154 Misc. 300, 277 N. Y. Supp. 584 (Surr. Ct. 1935). The requirement
that the equitable powers may only be evoked over matters relating to decedents' estates
is strictly enforced. In re Crosby's Estate, 136 Misc. 688, 242 N. Y. Supp. 207 (Sure.
Ct. 1930) (no jurisdiction over inter vivos trust because not a part of decedent's estate);
Is re Lyon's Ex'rs, 266 N. Y. 219, 194 N. E. 682 (1935).
33. Delaney v. Kennaugh, 105 Conn. 557, 136 Atl. 108 (1927) ; Shupe v. Jenks, 195
Wis. 334, 218 N. AV. 375 (1928) ; In re George's Estate, 225 Wis. 251, 274 N. W. 294
(1937).
34. "To remit the claimant to another forum after all these advances and retreats,
these reconnaissances and skirmishes, would be a postponement of justice equivalent to
a denial. If anything is due him, he should get it in the forum whose aid he has invokcd."
Cardozo, J., in Raymond v. Davis' Estate, 248 N. Y. 67, 72, 161 N. E. 421, 423 (1928).
The combining in one court of the jurisdiction sufficient to settle all questions involved
in estate settlement has been accomplished in England. See PAGE, op. cit. suipra note
5, at § 531.
35. In some states probate matters are dealt with by clerks of courts until motion
for contest is filed. IowA CODE (1935) § 11832; N. C. CODE ANN, (Michie, 1935) § 1;
UTAH REv. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 7564; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) § 5247. Although
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where independent courts are impractical, no reason appears for denying
that court which adjudicates the legal questions the power to determine in
the same action the equitable issues. If such additional work should crowd
the dockets, it would probably indicate the need of that community for a
separate court.30 In any case, it is clear that the desired finality for probate
decrees can never be completely achieved without general conformity to those
probate systems which embrace equitable jurisdiction.
APPORTIONMENT OF PROFITS IN COPYRIGHT INFRINGMENT CASES*
INCREASIXG dissatisfaction with the operation of the present obsolete copy-
right legislation" has inspired many recent attempts to reform the entire
copyright structure.2 Section 25 of the Copyright Act of 1909,3 providing
for the remedies and penalties to be imposed in case of infringement, has been
the subject of particularly -vitriolic criticism.4 The Section provides for an
injunction restraining infringement and imposes liability for "such damages
as the copyright proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement, as
well as all the profits which the infringer shall have made from such infringe-
ment . . . or in lieu of actual damages and profits, such damages as to the
not a competent system, it may correspond to the financial resources and meet the pro-
bate needs of these jurisdictions. In some states the probate judges are laymen. See
Smith, Some Comments on the District Probate System (1933) 7 CONN. B. J. 56.
36. A probate system need not be uniform throughout a state. Several states base
distinctions in probate practice upon population. IL. AN.. STAT. (Snith-Hurd, 1934)
c. 37, § 299; N. Y. CONsT. art. VI, § 13.
*Sheldon v. Mfetro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 26 F. Supp. 134 (S. D. N. Y. 1938).
1. 35 STAT. 1075 (1909), 17 U. S. C. §§ 1-63 (1934). Essentially unaltered since
1909, the present Act has long been the subject of general criticism. Solberg, Copyright
Law Reform (1925) 35 YALE L. J. 48; Solberg, The Present Copyright Situation (1930)
40 YALE L. J. 184. It has been adversely criticized especially in its application to modern
methods of marketing copyright material. Simpson, The Copyright Situation As Affecting
Radio Broadcasting (1931) 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 180. But see Caplan, The .1lcasure of
Recovery in Actions For the Inlringement of Copyright (1939) 37 Mlica. L RE%,. 564.
2. Hearings before Committee on Patents on Revision of Copyright Laics (House
of Representatives), 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) passim; SEN. REP. No. 896, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935) 1-2; Comment (1938) 47 Y.LE L. J. 433; Legis. (1938) 51 H,%n'v. L.
Rnv. 906. For an analysis of many proposed amendments see Solberg, The Present Copy-
right Situation (1930) 40 YAXn L. J. 184.
3. 35 STAT. 1075 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 25 (1934).
4. See Hearings, op. cit. supra note 2, at 115, 1106, 1187; Comment (1938) 47 YALE
L. J. 433, 436; Simpson, The Copyright Situation As Affecting Radio Broadcasting
(1931) 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 180; AkRcHEMrI, LAW OF rHE STAGE, SCME: AND RAVIO
(1936) 29 et seq.
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court shall appear to be just . . . "', The Section was apparently intended
to replace with a broad judicial discretion the fixed and arbitrary standards
of the common law, at the same time insuring a substantial but reasonable
recovery to the copyright owner.6 Unfortunately, the courts have interpreted
the provision with anything but uniformity and have frequently relied on old
case authority which the Statute was designed to abrogate. 7 It seem-, that
only by legislative revision can the resultant unfairness and ambiguity be
removed.
A recent decision aptly illustrates the urgent need for reform. Defendant's
motion picture "Letty Lynton" was held to infringe the copyright of plain-
tiff's play "Dishonored Lady." Further distribution of the picture was
enjoined.8 The case was then referred to a special master to determine the
amount of plaintiff's recovery. The master determined that defendant's net
profits from the picture were $587,604.37. No actual damages were proved.
Defendant introduced evidence to show that the picture's profits were prin-
cipally attributable to the box office drawing power of its principal stars,
Joan Crawford and Robert Montgomery. Defendant also proved that before
the Hays office interposed its veto plaintiff had agreed to sell the motion
picture rights to defendant for $30,000. The court reluctantly held that al-
though the evidence would justify a finding that the play was not responsible
for more than twenty-five per cent of the total profits, it was compelled, under
Section 25 and existing case authority, to award to the plaintiff the entire
net profits of the productionY
The'source of this inequitable result lies first in a series of cases decided
prior to the enactment of the present Statute.10 In the now famous case of
Mawman v. Tegg," Lord Eldon inaugurated the rule that in case of an
infringement, even though the entire copyrighted work is not plagiarized, if
portions thereof are so intermingled with the rest of the piratical work that
5. 35 STAT. 1075 (1909), 17 U. S. C. §25b (1934). The discretionary award of
statutory damages is limited by certain maximum and minimum amounts for various types
of infringement. The minimum requirement has created serious problems of interpre-
tation and been generally condemned. See generally IVEIL, COPYRIGHT LAW (1917) 469;
Solberg, Copyright Law Reform (1925) 35 YALE L. 3. 48.
6. "The phraseology of the section was adopted to avoid the strictness of construe-
tion incident to a law imposing penalties, and to give to the owner of a copyright some
recompense for the injury done him, in a case where the rules of law render difficult
or impossible proof of damages or discovery of profits." Roberts, J. in Douglas v.
Cunningham, 294 U. S. 207, 209 (1935). See AMOUR, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRActaI
(1936) 1111 et seq.
7. See Westerman Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U. S. 100 (1919); Jewell.
La Salle Realty Co. v. Buck, 283 U. S. 202 (1931); Harold Lloyd v. Witmer, 65 F.,
(2d) 1 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933); WEIL, COPYRIGHT LAW (1917) 469.
8. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F. (2d) 49 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936)
cert. denied, 298 U. S. 669 (1936).
9. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 26 F. Supp. 134 (S. D. N. Y. 1938).
10. Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U. S. 126 (1877) ; Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U. S.
617 (1888) ; Belford v. Scribner, 144 U. S. 488 (1892) ; West Publishing Co. v. Lawyers
Co-op. Ass'n, 79 Fed. 756 (C. C. A. 2d, 1897). See generally DRONE ON COPYRIGHT
(1879) 496 et seq.
11. [1826] 2 Russell 385.
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the derivative is indistinguishable from the original material, there can be
no apportionment of profits.12 Feeling, however, the unfairness of denying
all redress for the infringement, Eldon awarded the copyright owner the
entire net profits realized by the defendant. The results were rationalized by
an analogy to the common lawv doctrine of confusion of goods: one who
inextricably intermingles his own goods with those of another, making separ-
ation impossible, must suffer the consequences of his own wrong a3 This
decision, a landmark in copyright law, was followed in a long line of cases
and approved by the United States Supreme Court.14
With the enactment of the present Statute, however, the necessity of fol-
lowing these precedents disappeared. The discretionary powers vested in the
courts by the precise wording of Section 25 were designed to eliminate the
anomalous results of the Eldon principle, and many courts have expressly
denied the binding effect of the old cases since the adoption of that Section.'6
Persistence of the tendency on the part of some courts to avoid uncertain,
speculative approximations, however, has left the interpretation of the "in
lieu" clause still unsettled.1 6 When actual damages and profits are completely
unascertainable, the courts have consistently applied their discretionary powers
under the statutory damage provision to award a reasonable recovery to the
copyright owner 1 7 It also seems well settled that the courts may exercise
their discretion over damage awards whether actual damages are determinable
12. All formulas for apportioning the profits were rejected as being too sp culative
and uncertain. CoPiNGER, LAw OF COPYRIGHT (7th ed. 1936) 159; A-imun, COPRIMGHT
LAW AxD PRAcrIcn (1936) 1127 et seq.
13. See Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros., 240 U. S. 251 (1916); :V-L,
COPYRIGHT LAW (1917) 465, 474. But see L. Hand, J. in Cincinnati Car Co. v. N. Y.
Rapid Transit Co., 66 F. (2d) 592, 593 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) (" . . . infringement
often involves nice and casuistical questions which it is mere artifice to treat as involving
moral delinquency!').
14. Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U. S. 617 (1888) ; Belford v. Scribner, 144 U. S. 4S3
(1892). See Caplan, The Measure of Recovery In Actions for the Infrhigement of Copy-
right (1939) 37 MlicH. L. Rnv. 564, 570; McCoamicx, DA AGES (1935) C. 3.
15. See note 6, stpra; Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witmer, 65 F. (2d) 1, 46 (C. C. A.
9th, 1933) ; (1939) 52 HAxv. L. Rav. 688.
16. The Statute provides for damages and profits or in lieu thereof "such damages
as to the court shall appear to be just." 35 STAT. 1075 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 25b (1934).
Since the Statute is written in the alternative, it would seem that the court might assume
discretionary powers in making the award in every case, regardless of whether actual
damages or profits are proved or not. See Wells v. American Bureau of Engineering,
285 Fed. 371 (C. C. A. 7th, 1922). Hesitancy to assume such responsibility may have
influenced the generally accepted contrary interpretation. Compare Davilla v. Brunswick
Balke Collender Co., 94 F. (2d) 567 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) with Haas v. Feist, 234 Fed.
105 (S. D. N. Y. 1916) and Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Post Publishing Co., 27 F. (2d)
556 (D. Mass. 1928).
17. Westerman Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U. S. 100 (1919); No-Leak-O
Piston Ring Co. v. Norris, 277 Fed. 951 (C. C. A. 4th, 1921); Turner & Dahnken Y.
Crowley, 252 Fed. 749 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918). Within the limits of the statutory minimum
and maximum amounts the discretion of the trial court is unlimited and will not b1
reviewed by an appellate court. Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U. S. 207 (1935) ; Azmun,
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACriCE (1936) 1111 et seq.
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or not.'8 Dicta in the decided cases, however, indicate that they are without
authority to deny an accounting for profits; and proof of some specific amount
of profits results ipso facto in full recovery.'0 No valid basis for this dis-
tinction between the treatment of damages and profits can be found in the
Statute, and the idea that litigants may demand the traditionally discretionary,
equitable remedy of an accounting has been repugnant to many equity courts.'
Nevertheless, the court in the instant case felt sufficiently bound by such
authority to hold that since the "in lieu" clause was applicable only when it
is impossible to prove any specific amount of actual damages or profits, proof
of the net return in the instant case precluded the application of the court's
discretionary powers.2 This narrow construction of the statutory language
represents a serious limitation of the broad discretionary powers Congress
attempted to confer.
But even if it be granted that the court is correct in denying the application
of the "in lieu" clause, the unwarranted award of profits admittedly not
attributable to the infringement of plaintiff's play can hardly be justified. The
entire sum awarded concededly does not represent the "profits . . . made from
such infringement . . ."22 Incorporation of parts of the theme of a play
certainly is not responsible for all the lucrative returns of the modern motion
picture. In recognition of the unfairness of similar results in analogous patent
litigation, the courts, acting entirely without statutory authorization, filially
reversed the prior policy of avoiding all speculation and adopted the "reason-
able royalty rule."' 23 Where the patent infringed constituted but a minute
part of the completed machine, the Supreme Court suggested reliance upon
expert testimony to furnish a reasonable approximation of the actual profits
18. Russell & Stoll Co. v. Oceanic Elee. Co., 80 F. (2d) 864 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936);
Mail & Express Co. v. Life Publishing Co., 192 Fed. 899 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912). Cf.
Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 Fed. 145, 152 (S. D. N. Y. 1924).
19. See Davilla v. Brunswick Balke Collender Co., 94 F. (2d) 567, 568 (C. C. A.
2d, 1938); Straus v. Penn Printing Co., 220 Fed. 977, 980 (E. D. Penn. 1915). But see
West Publishing Co. v. Thompson, 176 Fed. 833 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910); McCaleb v. Fox
Film Corp., 299 Fed. 48 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924).
20. Prior to the present Act an accounting remained purely an equitable remedy
which equity would grant or refuse in its discretion. Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Ass'ii,
209 U. S. 20 (1908); West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 176 Fed. 833
(C. C. A. 2d, 1910). Since the enactment some equity courts have retained the same
discretionary powers. Haas v. Feist, 234 Fed. 105 (S. D. N. Y. 1916); Harold Lloyd
Corp. v. Witmer, 65 F. (2d) 1, 45 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933). Others have deemed the
statutory provisions mandatory. See note 19, supra; Caplan, The Measure of Recovery
In Actions For the Infringement of Copyright (1939) 37 Micr. L. Rsv. 564, 571.
21. See notes 16 and 19, supra.
22. 35 STAT. 1075 (1909), 17 U. S. C. §25b (1934).
23. The earlier courts generally followed the Eldon principle in patent cases. Eliza-
beth v. Pavement Co., 97 U. S. 126 (1877). The practice was supplanted by the courts
in favor of the more equitable result of estimating what would have been a reasonable
royalty for the use of the infringed patent and granting recovery accordingly. Standard
Supply Co. v. Cropp Concrete & Mfg. Co., 6 F. (2d) 447 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935). See
note 24, infra.
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attributable to the use of the infringed patent.24 The approval of this method
of computation marked the end of the Eldon principle of no apportionment
in patent cases.25 and the patentee now recovers only the profits actually
attributable to the infringement of his patent.
Equally reasonable methods of computation were available in the instant
case. The court justifiably ruled out of consideration the value which the
plaintiff put upon its copyright in incompleted negotiations with the defendant
prior to the infringement ;2G but, relying on expert opinion as suggested in
the patent cases, estimated the proper award at the liberal figure of $133,000
-twenty-five per cent of the net return, and on the alternative basis of an
eight per cent gross royalty reached an almost identical figure.? INth the
availability of such methods of computation to provide a fair approximation
of the correct recovery, the whole basis for Eldon's rule disappears as it
did in the patent cases.28 In any such estimate there is of course an unavoid-
able element of speculation; but this is more than compensated by the
removal of the vicious penalty of wholesale confiscation of profits for rela-
tively small infringements - a procedure just as inequitable as would be
the denial of all remedy to the copyright owner.
It would seem that the language of the present Act, in providing for an
award of the profits "due to the infringement", contemplates some method
of apportionment. But the fact that the court, despite the availability of ade-
quate means of computing a fair recovery, felt bound to follow the old rule,
provides a striking illustration of the state to which the terms of the Act
have been reduced by inconsistent judicial interpretation. The case offers
24. Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plov Co., 235 U. S. 641 (1915);
Cincinnati Car Co. v. N. Y. Rapid Transit Co., 66 F. (2d) 592 (C. C A. 2d, 1933).
See generally Duke, Trial of Patent Proceedings In Open Court (1922) 35 HLnv. L
REv. 33; (1928) 41 HA.v. L. REv. 905; 3 IVA=, PA'rmrs (Deller's Ed. 1937) §821
et seq.
25. The practice thus established by the courts has since been incorporated in the
Patent Act. 42 STAT. 392 (1922), 35 U. S. C. *§ 70 (1934). In the trademark and unfair
competition cases, however, judicial reluctance to speculate is still apparent and the
Eldon principle still applies despite the patent precedents. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co.
v. Wolf Bros., 240 U. S. 251 (1916); Dickinson v. 0. & IV. Thum Co., 8 F. (2d) 570
(C. C. A. 6th, 1925). See generally Nnss, UxxAm Coznurroxz A, Tntwz Mins
(3d ed. 1929) § 420 et seq.
26. Although the $30,000 figure for which plaintiff vas willing to sell the motion
picture rights, is of interest in comparison with the far greater amount actually awarded,
it is of no assistance in determining the "profits made from the infringement." L. C. Page
& Co. v. Fox Film Corp., 83 F. (2d) 196 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936). But cf. Paramore v. Mach
Sennet, Inc., 9 F. (2d) 66 (S. D. Cal. 1925).
27. The eight per cent gross royalty method conforms to the prescribed patent prac-
tice. 72 STAT. 392 (1922), 35 U. S. C. § 70 (1934). See note 23, mspra.
28. It was the absence of any reasonable, fixed formula by which the court could
determine accurately the actual contribution that the plaintiff's copyright made to the
total profits derived that led to the adoption of the Eldon principle. With an accepted
method available there is little justification for retention of the old rule. England has
long since rejected it. See John Lane, Ltd. v. Assdciated Newspapers, Ltd., [1936]
1 K. B. 715; Caplan, The Measure of Recovery In Aclions For the In riment of Copy-
right (1939) 37 sfcH. L. REv. 564, 571.
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strong justification for the proposed revision of our copyright laws by the
Duffy Bill,29 now pending before Congress. The proposed legislation would
effectively avoid the present anomalous result. It provides that in an action for
the recovery of profits made from an infringement, the copyright owner shall
be permitted to recover all or only such profits "as the court shall decree to
be just and proper." 30 While specific statutory authority to apportion profits,
on a basis similar to that provided in the Patent Act, might be advisable to
insure against the sort of judicial emasculation to which Section 25 has been
subjected, still the authority conferred by the Bill in its present form seems
sufficiently unambiguous to vest in the courts power to adopt their own
reasonable methods of apportionment, and should afford an adequate answer
to the instant court's hope that it would be reversed in favor of the more
equitable rule of the patent cases.
A NEW LIMITATION ON THE SCOPE OF DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS*
ISSUANCE of declaratory judgments in the federal courts rests generally on
principles clarified' by the Supreme Court in the leading case of Aetna Life
Insurance Company v. Haworth.2 If there is a present dispute over existing,
specific legal relations upon an established state of facts between parties whose
interests are bona fide, adverse and substantial, the remedy is generally held
available.3 Nor should its invocation be precluded by the existence of other
remedies.4 Hostile courts persist, however, in compressing the scope of the
29, S.3047, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); 79 CONG. REC. 12611 (1935). The Bill
represents the latest and most thorough-going revision to be proposed. Comment (1938)
47 YALE L. J. 433; Legis. (1938) 51 HARv. L. REv. 906, A leading innovation is the
proposal that the United States join the International Copyright Union, long urged by
both producer and user interests. Solberg, The International Copyright Union (1926)
36 YALE L. J. 68; Duffy, Iiternational Copyright (1937) 8 AIR L. REv. 213.
30. S. 7, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) § 17. Passage of the Bill is temporarily
impeded by the concerted opposition of powerful copyright proprietory interests on the
ground that it is an "infringers' bill." See brief filed by Mr. Nathan Burkan on behalf
of the American Society for Composers, Authors and Publishers, Hearings, op. cit, snpra
note 2 at 1093 et seq.; Comment (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 433; Caplan, The Measure of
Recovery In Actions For the Infringinent of Copyrights (1939) 37 Micil. L. REV. 564.
*Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Marr, 98 F. (2d) 973 (C. C. A. 10th, 1938).
1. Considerable conflict exists between federal and state decisions with reference
to prerequisites for the issuance of declaratory judgments. See BORCHAD, DECLARATORY
JuDGM=NTS (1934) 74-82, 149-158.
2. 300 U. S. 227 (1937).
3. Legis. (1936) 49 HARv. L. REv. 1351.
4. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Consumers Finance Service, 101 F. (2d) 514 (C. C. A.
3d, 1938); Columbian National Life Ins. Co. v. Foulke, 89 F. (2d) 261 (C. C. A. 8th,
1937). %
declaratory judgment between two limiting theories: on one side, the absence
of a controversy in its narrowest sense;' on the other, the availability of other
remedies. 6 The recent tendency to discredit devices used to expand these
limitations has seemed only to father the discovery of new restrictive tech-
niques.7
The latest example of the disposition to defeat the Federal Declaratory
Judgments Act s takes the form of a narrow construction of pleadings by
which they were found to disclose no controversy. An insurance company
joined the insured and the deceased's administrator as defendants in a suit for
judicial declaration of its non-liability upon an automobile accident policy.0
The insurer's duty to defend the insured was conditioned upon receipt of
proper notice of the accident and of subsequent claims. Its prayer for im-
munity was predicated upon omission of the first notice. Since there was a
dispute about whether or not the insured was actually involved in the acci-
dent, the petition averred that there was "an alleged accident." This averment
was followed by the customary allegations of failure to notify and of con-
troversy over whether the policy was thereby rendered inoperative. The court
took the view that, since the duty of the insured to notify depended on the
occurrence of an accident, the case turned ultimately on the determination of
that fact: in order to create a justiciable controversy, the insurer had to take
a definite stand on that issue adverse to the insured. An avowal of "an
alleged accident" not only failed to declare facts revealing a breach of contract,
but also rendered the insurer's position on the vital issue indistinguishable
from that of the insured. The petition was accordingly dismissed as failing
to state a cause of action.
This decision, in effect, restricted the company to the alternatives presented
by conventional procedure: to defend the insured, or to risk the consequences
of a refusal to defend. Since defense would imply waiver of the privilege
of maintaining that the policy was inoperative,' 0 the employment of that
strategy by the insurer would probably be injudicious, for trial of an accident
suit to a jury in a state court is notoriously likely to result in a judgment
against the insurance company. And even if the latter were to win, it would
still have to shoulder the expenses attendant upon the preparation of a negli-
gence suit. Should it refuse to defend, the administrator of the decedent
5. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Pierson, 21 F. Supp. 678 (IV. D. Ark.
1937) ; Merchants Mutual Casualty Co. v. Leone, 9 N. E. (2d) 552 (Mass. 1937). But
cf. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Plummer, 13 F. Supp. 169 (S. D. Te. 1935).
6. Nesbitt v. Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Co., 310 Pa. 374, 165 At. 403
(1933) ; Wolverine Mutual Motor Insurance Co. v. Clark, 277 Mich. 633, 270 N. NV. 167
(1936). Cf. Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Beers Chevrolet Co., 250 App. Div. 348,
294 N. Y. Supp. 82 (4th Dep't 1937).
7. See BORCHARD, DEcmAmiTORy JUDGMENrS AN D INSUPAzcE LmG.tTion, Address
before American Bar Ass'n, Section on Insurance Law (July 26, 1938).
S. 48 STAT. 955 (1934), 28 U. S. C. §400 (1935).
9. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Marr, 98 F. (2d) 973 (C. C. A. 10th, 1938).
10. Travelers Insurance Co. v. Young, 18 F. Supp. 450 (D. N. J. 1937); Ohio
Casualty Co. v. Plummer, 13 F. Supp. 169 (S. D. Te. 1935) ; Merchants Mutual Casualty
Co. v. Pinard, 87 N. H. 473, 183 Adt. 36 (1936). Contra: United States Fid. & Guar.
Co. v. Savoy Grill, 51 Ohio App. 504, 1 N. E. (2d) 946 (1936).
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would doubtless press the suit against the insured to judgment. A judgment
for the administrator would then foster a suit against the insurance company."
Only after all these events had occurred would the company have an oppor-
tunity to litigate the issue of the "coverage" of the policy, an issue upon which
a finding made before the negligence suit would obviously have been more
advantageous for all parties concerned. A judgment in favor of the insured,
on the other hand, would expunge the administrator's derivative right of
action against the insurer.12 But such a decision might prove even more
dangerous to the insurance company: if the insured should win the first suit
by proving his non-participation in the accident, the insurer would then be
exposed to a suit for breach of its duty to defend.13
When possible tactics are considered in the light of the company's objec-
tives, it becomes evident that the method actually chosen was the logical one
for achievement of those aims. The primary purpose of the company was
obviously to establish its own non-liability. But in order to maintain the
business prestige inherent in the preservation of the insured's good will, the
company doubtless desired to extricate him along with itself. These ends
could be achieved most effectively by combining within a single suit the
insured's defense of "no accident" and the company's claim that the policy
was inoperative. While no such feat could be achieved under conventional pro-
cedure, it seemed easily effected by a petition for a declaratory judgment;
and in thus taking the offensive, the insurance company gained the further
advantage of choice of forum.' 4
Had the company, in taking this step, followed the court's suggestion and
alleged that there was an accident, it would have lost the full benefits of the
remedy sought,1r for a finding that there was an accident would presage a
declaration of the insurer's immunity, thus defeating the company's second
objective-the retention of the insured's good will. Nor would an opposite
finding-that there was no accident-operate definitely to preclude further
litigation of the matter, despite the implication that the administrator had no
11. Where the insurance company denies coverage it is impossible to avoid two
suits, for the administrator cannot join the insurance company until the coverage issue
is settled. Fanslau v. Rogan, 194 Wis. 8, 215 N. W. 589 (1927).
12. Merchants Mutual Casualty Co. v. Leone, 9 N. E. (2d) 552 (Mass. 1937).
13. The policy required the insurance company to defend all claims, whether ground-
less or not. See Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Marr, 98 F. (2d) 973, 974 (C. C. A.
10th, 1938).
14. Federal courts formerly had the reputation of being more liberal toward insurance
companies; but there may be less basis for this now in light of Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
15. The insurer might have alleged "no accident," in the hope of successfully ter-
minating all litigation by establishment of that fact. Although this raises no issue between
insurer and insured, it precipitates a controversy between insurer and administrator.
But it fails to throw into dispute the fundamental question of whether the insurer's duty
to perform under the policy has arisen, for the latter can raise that issue only by taking
a position adverse to the insured. The issue with the administrator is immaterial; his
rights in the policy are derived from those of the insured. Merchants Mutual Casualty
Co. v. Leone, 9 N. E. (2d) 552 (Mass. 1937). Furthermore, interests of comity between
state and federal courts would militate against acceptance of jurisdiction, See Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Consumers Finance Service, 101 F. (2d) 514, 515 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938).
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cause of action. Since the insurer's claim of an accident would be in accord
with the administrator's contention on that point, the issue would not be
litigated between them.16 There is grave doubt, accordingly, as to whether
a finding on this question could subsequently be used by the insurer as res
judicata against the administrator."7 The confusion thus created might result
in a holding that the insurance company was liable on the ground of "no
accident" in this first suit and of "accident" in the subsequent tort action.
In contrast with such devious courses as those outlined above stands the
proposition that the petition presented in the principal case should have been
admitted. The court could reasonably have concluded, under the circum-
stances, that the words "an alleged accident" amounted to permissible alterna-
tive pleading s8 recognizing the company's point that determination of the
issue either way would result in the same judicial declaration. Sufficient
latitude would have been granted to what was in reality a triangular, rather
than a two-sided, dispute. The real adversaries on the accident issue, insured
and administrator, would then necessarily litigate the question of the insured's
part in the accident and the former would have full opportunity to present
his defense of "no accident" without jeopardizing the insurance company's
rights. Failure of this defense would leave the insured exposed to a suit on
the issue of negligence, but would absolve the insurer from duty to defend
because of the failure of notification. A decision that the insured took no
part in the accident would be res judicata against the administrator and would
therefore conclude all litigation of the matter.29 In either event, the court
would, then and there, be compelled to declare that the company was not
liable.20
16. In suits testing the extent of the policy's coverage, insurer and insured are the
real parties of interest. The administrator's only interest is derived through the insured.
Auto Mutual Indemnity Co. v. DuPont, 21 F. Supp. 606 (D. Del. 1937).
17. Res judicata is ordinarily invoked to enable a party to a suit to prevent his
adversary from reopening the issue in another action. Behind this lies the theory that
the opponent was presented with an adequate opportunity to litigate the issue in the first
suit. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Gordon, 95 F. (2d) 605 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933);
cf. Good Health Dairy Products Corp. v. Emery, 275 N. Y. 14, 9 N. E. (2d) 758 (1937).
An attempt to fit this rationale to the anomalous situation disclosed in the principal case
results in confusion, for the administrator and the insurer are only nominally adverse
on what the court concedes to be the vital issue. In order to obtain a declaration that
the policy is operative, a finding of "no accident" must be made. Nevertheless, the
administrator cannot urge this contention, for it might estop him from founding the
subsequent tort action against the insured on the claim that there was an accident. Conse-
quently, the suit for declaratory judgment gives him no opportunity to present his case
and should not be used to bar him in a subsequent suit. Cf. Maryland Casualty Co.
v. Consumers Finance Service, 23 F. Supp. 433, 434 (M. D. Pa. 1933).
18. Aiken Mills v. Boss Mfg. Co., 65 F. (2d) 344 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933); Reeve v.
Cromwell, 237 N. Y. Supp. 20, 227 App. Div. 32 (1st Dep't 1929).
19. The insurance company, even though not an adversary on this issue, can use the
finding as res judicata because its liability is derived from that of the insured. Good
Health Dairy Products Corp. v. Emery, 275 N. Y. 14, 9 N. E. (2d) 758 (1937) ; Coca
Cola v. Pepsi-Cola Corp., 36 Del. 124, 172 At. 260 (1934).
20. It is conceivable, of course, that the policy could be declared operative without
a finding on the accident issue, in which case it would be possible to hold the insurance
company liable for the defense of the tort action even under an equivocal allegation.
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The court was unquestionably correct in declaring that the decision had
to rest on a finding of the existence or non-existence of an accident. It seems
no less obvious, however, that when the fact of the accident is itself disputed,
the problem of the insurance company's legal relations presents a valid con-
troversy capable of final adjudication.21 Accordingly, while the court's deduc-
tion that the insurance company had to select one side of that issue was per-
missible, its conclusion was by no means inevitable. The decision is technically
correct; but the fact that the company was entitled to be released under either
alternative seems to call for the adoption of a somewhat broader view of the
controversy.
Denial of the remedy in the instant case may have been influenced by the
unusual situation which enabled the insurance company to plead existence
of an accident in the declaratory judgment suit and, if unsuccessful, to plead
non-existence of the accident as a part of the defense in the tort action. Per-
mission to enhance this already favorable position by a combination of the
two theories in one suit by equivocal allegation may have struck the court
as an arrangement unduly favorable to the insurance company. By requiring
the company to choose one side of the accident issue, the court could at least
preserve the possibility that the insurer's resources would remain available
to the insured and the administrator. It is more likely, however, that the
remedy was withheld on the more fundamental bases of disapproval of
"coverage" defenses 22 and desire to discourage the conversion of the Declara-
tory Judgments Act into a removal statute.23
The decision will probably strengthen two fronts: restriction of "coverage"
defenses and limitation of the scope of declaratory judgments. The fact that
the defense was one which would be unavailable in the tort suit in the state
court eliminates the possibility of federal encroachment on state jurisdiction,
rendering arguments of comity inapplicable. 24 An objective evaluation of
the case must depend, then, upon balancing the well known views of exponents
of the declaratory judgment against the equally familiar arguments advanced
by those who feel insurers should be denied refuge in technicalities. Although
analysis of these arguments would lead only to a stalemate, it is extremely
questionable whether, in general, the desire to handicap insurance companies
should take precedence over the maintenance of a readily accessible judiciary.
The fact that the declaratory judgment has been heralded as a procedure by
which a party may conclude ordinarily multiple litigation in a single suit2
seems to indicate application rather than denial of the remedy in such situa-
tions as that of the instant case.
21. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hubbard & Employers Liability Assurance Co.,
22 F. Supp. 697, 699 (S. D. Cal. 1938) ; BORCHARD, DEcAAxToRs JUDGMrMTs (1934) 36.
22. See BORCHARD, DECLAPATORY JUDGMENTS AND INSURANCE LiTIGATioN, Address
before American Bar Ass'n, Section on Insurance Law (July 26, 1938).
23. The latter finds expression in comity arguments, which provide a valid basis
for denying federal jurisdiction where the identical issues are pending in a state suit,
and where no litigation will be avoided by the declaratory judgment or where the petition
is ifierely an attempt to try various defenses piecemeal instead of in a single suit. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Quarles, 92 F. (2d) 321 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937); American
Motorists Insurance Co. v. Busch, 22 F. Supp. 72 (S. D. Cal. 1938) ; Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Consumers Finance Service, 101 F. (2d) 514 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938).
24. See note'23, siupra.
25. Cornent (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 286.
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TAXATION OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS AS SALE OR
EXCHANGE OF CAPITAL ASSETS*
IN DETERMINING to what extent income is subject to taxation, Congress
has permitted the taxpayer to deduct in full from his gross income both bad
debts1 and the ordinary losses sustained in transactions entered into for
profit.2 However, when a loss is sustained on the sale or exchange of capital
assets, the Revenue Act 3 prescribes a method of computation having less
factual connection with the increase or decrease of the actual capital net worth
of the taxpayer within the taxable year.4 The right to claim a deduction of
such capital losses is severely curtailed for the two-fold purpose of increasing
the revenues of the Federal Government and discouraging speculative trans-
actions. 5 Though it would seem reasonably simple to distinguish a bad debt
or an ordinary loss from a capital loss resulting from the sale or exchange
of capital assets, a possible difficulty may arise in drawing the line between
the two in a transaction which has attained importance because of its fre-
quency-the compromise of a debt with an impecunious debtor.
This problem is raised in a recent decision of the Board of Tax Appeals."
The owner of real estate in Florida had sold his land in 1926 for five hundred
thousand dollars, receiving payment partly in cash and partly in promissory
notes secured by a mortgage on the property sold. At that time the vendor
reported the entire amount of his profit from this transaction and taxes were
duly paid thereon. Afterwards the purchaser defaulted on the notes, and,
being unable to live up to his obligation, agreed with the vendor to reconvey
the land in consideration of the cancellation of his notes for about three hun-
dred and six thousand dollars. At the time of the reconveyance in 1932 the
property had a market value of two hundred and forty-two thousand dollars.
The vendor claimed to be entitled to deduct the unsatisfied balance of his
claim as a bad debt or in the alternative as an ordinary loss. The Board,
however, followed the contention of the Commissioner and decided that the
transaction was a sale or exchange of the land for the notes and the mortgage,
and as such it was deductible only in accordance with the capital gain and
loss provisions of the Act of 1932.7
* Harry Payne Bingham, 38 B. T. A. 913 (1938).
1. INTERAL REvax1,,E AcT § 23 (k) (1), 52 ST.T. 460 (1938), 26 U. S. C. A.
§23 (k) (1) (Supp. 1938).
2. INTRNAL REVEN AcT § 23 (e) (2), 52 STAT. 460 (1938), 26 U. S. C. A.
§ 23 (e) (2) (Supp. 1938).
3. I-TEr.Au REvENuE AcT § 117, 52 STAT. 500 (193S), 26 U. S. C. A. § 101 (Supp.
1938).
4. Cf. Hendricks, Federal Income Tax: Capital Gains and Losses (1935) 49 -Lnv.
L. REv. 262, 281.
5. See 2 PAUL AND MERTENS, THE LAw OF FrE.DrxAL I.N-coE TAXATIO:N (1934)
§ 19.03; Comment (1937) 32 I.. L. REv. 189, 195.
6. Harry Payne Bingham, 38 B. T. A. 913 (1938).
7. In view of the provisions of the Act of 1932 [IxM-.AL REVmENu Ac" § 101,
47 STAT. 191 (1932)] the result here reached is not inequitable since it leaves the tax-
payer where he would have been, had the original contract called for a purchase price
equal to the sum actually received. The principal case, however, is not based on this
fact at all, nor is it limited in its application to cases arising under the Act of 1932.
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While the Revenue Act itself does not contain any specific provisions con-
cerning the problem under discussion, regulations under the Act expressly
provide for the treatment of similar losses sustained by mortgagees.8 If in
the case of the mortgagor's default the mortgagee forecloses on the property
and the proceeds of the judicial sale do not satisfy his claim, he may deduct
as a bad debt any uncollectible deficiency. If the mortgagee acquires the
property at foreclosure sale he may charge off as a bad debt, when uncol-
lectible, the excess of his total claim over the part of the obligation applied
to the bid price.9 The present case would seem closely analogous-differing
only in the absence of judicial proceedings-to the situation of a mortgagee
who purchases property pledged to him at foreclosure for an amount equal
to the market value of such property and then finds the balance of his claim
to be uncollectible. The conclusive presumption established by the Board in
the principal case and the Bureau in a prior ruling10 that the mortgagee
who accepts in full satisfaction title to the property mortgaged to him is
thereby applying his total claim to its purchase is without foundation.1 1 Such
a view appears to be irreconcilable with the accepted holding that in the case
of a voluntary conveyance of property-as distinguished from judicial sale
-the fair market value of the property determines the question of a realiza-
tion of taxable income.12
8. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 23(k)-3.
9. These regulations have now been supplemented by recent Bureau Rulings [I T.
3121, XVI-2 Cum. BuLL. 138 (1937); I. T. 3159, XVII-1 Cumx. Buu.. 188 (1938)]
to the effect that the mortgagee may claim a capital loss measured by the difference
between the market value of the property and the basis of the obligation of the debtor
applied to the bid price. In case the mortgagee purchases the property at foreclosure for
an amount equal to his total claim or in case he accepts a voluntary conveyance of the
property in full satisfaction, the ruling concedes only the deduction of a capital loss
measured by the difference between the market value of the property and the bid price,
thus depriving the mortgagee of any opportunity to claim a bad debt deduction. The
ruling seems of doubtful validity in view of the holding of the United States Supreme
Court in Helvering v. Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 U. S. 216 (1937), (1937) 46 YALE
L. J. 1406 that the bid price conclusively fixes the value of the property for income tax
purposes. And recently the case of Hadley Falls Trust Co. v. United States, 22 F. Supp,
346 (D. Mass. 1938) squarely disregarded I. T. 3121, supra, by holding that the mort-
gagee who purchases property at foreclosure does not sustain any loss until lie disposes
of the property. If the part of the ruling applicable to the taxation of mortgagees after
foreclosure is disregarded by the courts, the provisions concerning the treatment of
compromise agreements will fall simultaneously.
10. J. T. 3121, XVI-2 Cum. BuLL. 138 (1937).
11. See PAUL AND MERTENS, Op. cit. supra note 5 at § 19.31, n. 1ld (Supp. 1938)
criticizing the inconsistency of the ruling.
12. If a mortgagee purchases at foreclosure property for an amount equal to his
claim for principal and interest, he is subject to income tax for the interest even if the
market value of the property is less than the principal of the debt. Helvering v. Mid-
land Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 U. S. 216, 108 A. L. R. 441 (1937). But if he accepts prop-
erty voluntarily conveyed to him in full satisfaction, he may show that in view of the
market value of the property he did not receive satisfaction for his claim for interest.
Helvering v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 78 F. (2d) 778 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934), (1937)
15 CHI-KENT REv. 240.
The Board contends, however, that an agreement to accept property in
satisfaction of an existing indebtedness is a sale or exchange of the debtor's
notes for the property and not a payment of the notes by the transfer of
property.13 Consequently the mortgagee is deemed to have sustained merely
a capital loss measured by the difference between the market value of the
property and the amount of his claim. To support its position the Board
relies on a holding to the effect that the mortgagor who transfers assets to
a creditor to satisfy an obligation calling for cash payment sells or exchanges
such property for his notes.' 4 Obviously such a transaction constitutes an
exchange from the mortgagor's standpoint, since he receives a discharge
from his obligation in consideration of a conveyance of assets of less value.1'5
However, to find an exchange in the principal case the Board must rely on
the highly technical argument that the mortgagee receives new consideration
for his release of the debtor from his obligation to pay a larger sum of money,
the consideration taking the form of a conveyance of the property already
mortgaged to him and a release of the mortgagor's right to redeem such
property.
Though it is possible to support the Treasury's view on tenuous legalistic
grounds, the result is inconsistent with the well established rule that a
creditor may apply assets pledged or conveyed to him in partial satisfaction
of his claim without the transaction being regarded as an exchange of such
property for a part of the debtor's obligation.'0 The Department, moreover,
admits that a creditor who accepts in full satisfaction a cash settlement is
not thereby exchanging the debtor's notes or parts of them for the cash
received.' 7 Nor is the acceptance of notes issued by a subsidiary of the
debtor in satisfaction of a claim against the latter considered a sale or ex-
change.is It would be more consistent with these holdings if the Bureau
would abandon its technical position in the instant case, and instead rule
13. To the same effect is another recent ruling of the Bureau applicable to a con-
veyance of title of securities already pledged to the creditor to him by vay of com-
promise. I. T. 3167, XVII-1 Cum. BumL. 190 (1938).
14. Betty Rogers, 37 B. T. A. 897 (1938). If this decision is compared, however,
*with the cases of C. Griffith Warfield, 38 B. T. A. 907 (1938) and H. L. Rust, 38
B. T. A. 910 (1938), it will also appear that in the treatment of the mortgagor's losses
the holdings of the Board are inconsistent.
15. The mortgagor in this case would, if solvent, realize taxa-rble income. L D. Cod-
don & Bros., Inc., 38 B. T. A., Feb. 23, 1938; cf. Dallas Transfer & Term. Warehouse
Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 70 F. (2d) 95 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934).
16. Southern Calif. Box Co. v. United States, 46 F. (2d) 724 (Ct. Cl. 1931); Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue v. Wilson, 90 F. (2d) 788 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) ; Sunflower
Packing Corp., 2 B. T. A. 1104 (1925); Cornelius Lumber Co., 5 B. T. A. 215 (1926);
Kansas City Pump Co., 6 B. T. A. 938 (1927); Harold S. Denniston, 37 B. T. A. 834
(1938) (holding that even the acceptance of H. 0. L. C. bonds in partial satisfaction of
an indebtedness does not constitute a sale or exchange, despite the holding in Josephine
C. Bowen, 37 B. T. A. 412 (1938) to the effect that the acceptance of H. 0. L. C. bonds
in full satisfaction is to be treated as such a sale or exchange).
17. L T. 3121, XVI-2 Cum. BuLL. 138 (1937); Hale v. Helvering, 85 F. (2d)
819 (App. D. C. 1936).
18. Charles T. Carlson, 39 B. T. A., Jan. 24, 1939. Cf. Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Commissioner of Int. Rev., 59 F. (2d) 168 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932).
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that a creditor who accepts in full satisfaction a conveyance of property does
not exchange the debtor's notes for such property but cancels them. For
the creditor is not really receiving a new consideration in such a case; rather,
the parties are merely dispensing with the formality of a judicial sale. 19 It
should be immaterial for the legal construction of a transaction to determine
whether or not an obligation is satisfied by the payment of money or the
conveyance of property.
Morever, the Board's position appears to lack a substantiating policy. For
in order to avoid the result reached in the principal case, the parties may
simply resort to the practice of having the mortgagor sell the property to
an outsider and then turn over the proceeds to the mortgagee. Thus if the
mortgagee should ascertain the balance of his claim to be uncollectible, he
could charge it off as a bad debt.20 Yet there would seem to be little reason
for encouraging this procedure as it would only result in a sacrifice sale of
the property, thereby causing increased loss to the mortgagee and conse-
quently to the government. And since, without more, the payment of a smaller
sum does not constitute good consideration for a discharge of the debtor from
his obligation to pay a larger amount,21 the mortgagor may often be reluctant
to reach such an agreement. Unable to attain a friendly settlement, judicial
proceedings and foreclosure will be the only alternative by which the mort-
gagee may deduct in full any deficiency. 22 It seems unreasonable to encourage
litigation in this way, and to reduce the mortgagee's recovery by the added
administrative expenses of foreclosure sale and deficiency judgment. More-
over, these costs are deductible in full, so the final result would be a reduction
rather than an increase of the federal revenues.23
Finally, the sale of property and subsequent attempt of the vendor to
minimize the loss arising from the vendee's inability to pay, taken as a whole,
presents a single rather than two separate transactions. 24 And as such, it is
19. See the dissent by Smith, member, in the instant case. Harry Payne Bingham,
38 B. T. A. 913 (1938). It is not necessary that the taxpayer obtain a deficiency judg-
ment in order that he be entitled to claim deduction for worthless debts. Though a volun-
tary discharge will not do [American Felt Co. v. Burnet, 58 F. (2d) 530 (App. D. C.
1930)] a charge-off is sufficient if sound business judgment indicates that a claim is un-
collectible. United States v. White Dental Mlfg. Co., 274 U. S. 398 (1927); Deeds v.
Commissioner of Int. Rev., 47 F. (2d) 695 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931); Ruppert v. United
States, 22 F. Supp. 428 (Ct. Cl. 1938).
20. Cf. Hale v. Helvering, 85 F. (2d) 819 (App. D. C. 1936).
21. ANsoN, CONTRACTS (Corbin's ed. 1930) § 140.
22. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 23(k)-3.
23. Edward S. Phillips, 9 B. T. A. 1016 (1927).
24. Though the provisions applicable to bad debts and ordinary losses have been
held to be mutually exclusive [Spring City Foundry v. Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue, 292 U. S. 182 (1934)] the taxpayer's claim for deduction can be sustained under
either provision. The taxpayer may possibly treat the compromise as a completed trans-
action giving rise to a loss, in view of the actual inability of the mortgagor to pay the
balance, despite the fact that the loss stems from an uncollectible debt. Sunflower Pack-
ing Co., 2 B. T. A. 1104 (1925) ; First National Bank of Durant, 6 B. T. A. 545 (1927).
Or on the other hand he may claim deduction under the bad debt provisions if the debt
is ascertained to be worthless and charged off at least simultaneously with the cancella-
tion agreement, for after the cancellation no charge-off is possible since the debt has
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a normal business procedure, definitely not falling within the scope of the
disfavored speculative deals which Congress has subjected to drastic taxa-
tion.25 The instant decision has little to be said in its favor; by a highly
technical process of reasoning it reaches a result contrary to public policy.
CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN MORTGAGEES*
PRINcIPLEs, not precedents, should be the primary concern of a court of
equity. Contribution rests on the principle that where a group of persons
is subject to a common obligation which none has the prior duty to discharge,
one of the group who inofficiously discharges more than his proportionate
share is entitled to ratable reimbursement from the others. In certain com-
mon situations the application of this principle is well settled; among co-
sureties,2 joint principal debtors,3 and increasingly among joint tort-feasors, 4
ceased to edst. Deeds v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 47 F. (2d) 695 (C. C. A. 6th,
1931); Schuh Drug Co. v. United States, 49 F. (2d) 644 (E. D. Ill. 1931); ef. Brown
v. United States, 95 F. (2d) 487 (C. C. .- 3d, 1938); 3 PAUL AND Men:-S, op. Cit.
supra note 5, at §§ 26.46, 28.09.
25. Since payment of an obligation does not constitute a sale or exchange Congress
had to enact specific provisions in order to tax holders of bonds redeemed before ma-
turity. Internal Revenue Act § 117 (f), 48 STAT. 714 (1934), 26 U. S. C. § 101(i)
(1934); cf. Felin v. Kyle, 22 F. Supp. 556 (E. D. Pa. 1938); John H. Watson, Jr., 27
B. T. A. 463 (1932). And in order to deprive the holders of worthless "securities" of
their right to claim a bad debt deduction, it was necessary to insert in the Act of 1938
a specific provision to this effect. Revenue Act § 23(k) (2), 52 STAT. 460 (1933), 26
U. S. C. A. § 23(k) (2) (Supp. 1938). This shows clearly that it was not intended to
regard transactions between creditor and non-corporate debtor as falling vithin the scope
of the capital gain and loss provisions.
26. The principal holding would also cause great injustice in view of the fact that
a taxpayer who receives in full satisfaction of a claim property of less value may only
deduct a small percentage of his loss while he would be held to have realized a taxable
gain if immediately after its acquisition he sells the property to a third party for an
amount equal to his original claim. See Mo%,rcesmmy, FE ,Aln cO ICOn-Tz x I-L. o-
BooK (1935) 540.
* Snyder v. Elkan, 199 S. E. 891 (Ga. 1938).
1. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 124 Conn. 2-27, 199 Ad.
93 (1938); Houston v. Bain, 170 Va. 378, 196 S. E. 657 (1938); 4 PomEnoy's Equi"r
Junispr uDmc (4th ed. 1918) § 1418; 2 STORvs EQurr- JuaxspawuP-=Ec (14th ed. 1918)
§ 648; RESTATEmzNT, REsTT UTioN (1937) § 81.
2. See Comment (1931) 6 No=a DAm LAwy. 369; 2 SToa"s Etjuin Junisrnu-
axca § 669 et seq. Statutory provisions are common. E.g., Irn. STAT. Am . (Burns,
1933) § 3-2506.
3. Carter v. Lechty, 72 F. (2d) 320 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934), with extensive citations
at 322; Quintin v. Magnant, 285 Mass. 450, 189 N. E. 209 (1934) ; Hanson, Contribution
Between Multiple Codebtors (1937) 86 U. or PA. L. Rav. 25.
4. The common law policy against adjusting equities between wrongdoers is dis-
regarded where the nature of the wrong permits: REsTATErN, REsTiTuTiO, (1937)
§§ 99-102; or by statute: e.g., N. Y. Crv. PRac. ACT §211a. Gregory, Tort Contribu-
tion Practice in N. Y. (1935) 20 CORx. L. Q. 269.
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contribution is quite generally granted. A recent case,r however, illustrates
an occasional hesitancy in the courts to extend the settled rules to a less usual
situation.
Three pieces of property, mortgaged to three separate mortgagees, were
the only -holdings of the mortgagor, who became insolvent and was unable
to pay the taxes on any of them. Under an unusual Georgia statute, where-
by delinquent taxes on a piece of property became a prior lien upon all of the
taxpayer's real estate,6 the county took execution on a single piece for the
taxes due on all three and purchased a tax deed on the parcel for the aggre-
gate sum of the taxes. Failing in an attempt to set the sale aside, the mort-
gagee who had thus lost his security recovered in personam judgments
against the other two mortgagees for contribution of proportionate shares
of the tax liens discharged. The appellate tribunal reversed the decrees on
defects of pleading, 7 but not resting its decision solely on such defects, denied
the application of the remedy of contribution in this situation on the ground
that there was "no joint or common liability as between (the plaintiff) and
the other creditors, to be discharged by him in behalf of all." In reaching
this conclusion, the court may have been influenced by certain differences
between the situation in the instant case and that in the more common exam-
ples of contribution. Between co-sureties, for example, there is a close per-
sonal relationship, arising out of contractual participation in a common enter-
prise, which makes fairly evident the "reciprocal rights and duties" which
the court was unable to discover in the instant case. Similarly, where the
common burden involved is incident to the ownership of property, such a
relationship is generally found in privity of title in the parcel-the privity,
for example, between tenants in common or life tenant and remainder-
man.8 But however usual they may be, neither a close personal relationship
5. Snyder v. Elkan, 199 S. E. 891 (Ga. 1938). On demurrer, Bibb County v. Ell:an,
184 Ga. 520, 192 S. E. 7 (1937).
6. GA. CODE (1933) § 92-5708; see In re Rogers & Williams, 3 F. Supp. 116, 117
(S. D. Ga. 1933). Almost universally, however, the real estate tax lien on each tract of
land is for the taxes against such tract only. 3 COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 1236.
Personal property taxes sometimes become a prior lien upon all the owner's real estate.
(1929) 42 HAgv. L. Ray. 961.
7. The court said that since under GA. CoDE (1933) § 92-5712 the plaintiff might
have released his property by payment of its proportionate share of the tax lien, discharge
of the entire burden by execution did not appear compulsory. This apparent officiousness
was due to a mere pleading defect-the failure properly to allege lack of notice of the
sale as the cause of the plaintiff's failure to pursue this remedy. Further, unless
all equitable relief is to be denied for lack of diligence, failure to make actual payment
under this provision should not render loss of the property so officious or "voluntary"
as to preclude contribution. See (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 151, n. 20. But cf. In re Lohr's
Estate, 200 Atl. 135 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1938), construing PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit.
72, §§ 5968, 5969 to make the payor a volunteer.
8. Between tenants in common or joint tenants: RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION
(1937) § 105, comments a, b; cf. Jamison v. Cotton, 136 Cal. App. 127, 28 P. (2d) 39
(1933). Between life tenant and remainderman: 3 Po~xERoy's EourrY JjuRsRuMNce
§ 1223. To a lesser degree this "privity" is present between persons taking property
from a common source and subject to a debt arising therefrom. An heir or legatee pay-
ing the debt of the common ancestor may obtain contribution from his co-heirs, Camp-
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in contract cases, nor privity in the same parcel in property cases, is essential
to contribution relief.9 For instance, where securities have been validly but
wrongfully pledged by a broker so that all are subject in common to his debt,
and some of them survive a sale by the pledgee in satisfaction of the debt,
those whose securities were sold are entitled to contribution from the owners
of the surviving securities despite the absence of any sort of privity between
the various security holders.' 0 The only relationship essential to contribu-
tion is that the parties involved, or in cases incident to property, the prop-
erty interests involved, be equally1 ' subject to a common burden.
The instant case differs from more familiar examples of contribution not
only in the type of relationship, but also in the type of obligation involved.
Unlike co-sureties, the mortgagees here have in no way personally bound
themselves to discharge the common debt: the only claim of the county was
upon the mortgaged land itself. The court was therefore quite correct in
reversing the in persoiam decrees.' 2 But the absence of personal liability
does not preclude a remedy; it merely changes its form from an in personam
to an in ren decree. Such a decree, for instance, may properly be awarded
against a piece of property subject, itfl other parcels, to a common mort-
gage subsequently discharged in full by the owner of one of the other par-
cels, although the grantee of the delinquent parcel has not personally as-
sumed the mortgage debt.' 3 For in that situation, as in the instant case, the
bell v. Lederer Realty Corp., 136 At!. 248 (R. I. 1927), aff'd, 136 At. 926 (1927).
Stockholder-distributee of dissolved corporation, paying tax deficiency, was entitled to
contribution from the other stockholders. Phillips-Jones Corp. v. Parmley, 302 U. S.
233 (1937) ; (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 143.
9. "In the exercise of this jurisdiction courts in no way regard the existence of a
contractual relation as material, and privity between the parties is not essential. Though
the substantive basis of the assumed obligation is occasionally referred to as 'quasi-con-
tractual,' and though privity is sometimes spoken of as an element, it is thoroughly well
settled that the contract is a fiction and the privity such as the law itself creates from
the mere discharge of the obligation." 2 LAWRENCE oN E%2UITu J RIsPRUDzt cE (1929)
§ 739.
10. Asylum of St. Vincent de Paul v. 'McGuire, 239 N. Y. 375, 146 N. E. 632, 33
A. L. R. 1219 (1925), holding that "The right to contribute here invoked is not de-
pendent on contract, or joint action, or original relationship between the parties." Con-
tra: Palley v. Worcester County National Bank, 291) Mass. 501, 195 X. E. 717 (1935)
(minority rule). See Note (1932) 76 A. L. R. 794.
11. In the instant case the tax lien attached subsequent to convey-ance of all the mort-
gage interests, hence they were equally liable for it. When properties of a debtor
already liable as security for his debt are conveyed simultaneously, they are like%,ise
equally subject to the burden. But when conveyed successively they are liable in the
inverse order of alienation, since presumably the debtor intended after each conveyance
that the debt be satisfied out of his remaining properties. Hence contribution is not
available. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 74 F. (2d)
881 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935); Clark v. Monroe County Bank, 33 Ga. App. 81, 125 S. E. 603
(1924); GA. CoDE (1933) § 39-118; 3 JONES ON MoRTGAGES (8th ed. 1923) §§2034-2093.
12. REsTAEMENT, RESTITUTION (1937) § 104, comment a; cf. Wood v. Scott, 48
S. v. (2d) 1024 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
13. 2 JoNEs ON MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 1393. Provided, of course, the owner
discharging the mortgage debt had not himself assumed it. Id. § 1394. Cf. Lach v. Weber,
123 N. J. Eq. 303, 197 At!. 417 (Ch. 1938) ; Wood v. Scott, 48 S. W. (2d) 1024 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1932).
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various parcels of land, since they are equally subject to execution to pay
the mortgage or tax debt owed by the common mortgagor, become in effect
impersonal co-sureties 14 for its discharge; and except for the difference in
the nature of the decree, the principles governing contribution between co-
sureties apply. When one parcel has discharged the common debt by going
into execution, it acquires, through subrogation 15 to the rights of the original
creditor who took the execution, a right of contribution against the other
"co-surety" parcels.
Where, however, the right of contribution lies in a piece of property, it
becomes essential to determine who can enforce the right. Under settled
principles, where one holding an interest in a parcel makes an actual pay-
ment of more than that parcel's pro rata share of the common debt, either
to protect it from execution or to redeem 1' it subsequently, the payor is
entitled to the decrees of contribution against the other "co-surety" parcels.
By analogy it seems apparent that where, as in the instant case, the property
itself has gone in execution with no subsequent redemption, those interested
in the parcel-whether first or second mortgagees, pledgees, tax or judg-
ment lienholders, or residual owners-have, through the sacrifice of their
interests, in effect "paid" the debt.' 7 They should therefore be entitled to
enforce the parcel's right of contribution, dividing the proceeds of the action
according to the priority of their interests.
Similarly, those holding interests in the "co-surety" parcels are proper
parties defendant in a suit for contribution by those with interests in the
parcel on which execution has been taken. Any of these potential defendants
has the privilege, though none has the duty, to forestall the execution, in
such a suit, against the parcel in which he is interested, by paying in advance
himself its pro rata share of the common burden discharged by the plaintiff.18
14. The analogy of impersonal co-suretyship is not a new one. See Comment (1925)
35 YALE L. J. 92. Cf. RESTATEmENT, RESTITUTION (1937) § 103, comment d.
15. See (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 683; SHELDON ON SUBROGATION (2d ed. 1893) § 1.
Without subrogation to the priorities of the county's tax lien in the instant case, the
plaintiff's contribution claim against the properties would have no priority over the de-
fendants' mortgages. On the other hand, where in a like situation the plaintiff purchased
all the tax liens and sought to enforce them in full against the other mortgage, his
right as subrogee was curtailed by the doctrine of contribution to a pro rala recovery.
Brooks v. Matledge, 100 Ga. 367, 28 S. E. 119 (1897); cf. Ruthrauff v. Silver King
Western Min. & Mill. Co., 95 Utah 279, 80 P. (2d) 338 (1938).
16. All persons who are interested in the premises, and would be prejudiced by a
foreclosure, have a right to redeem; 2 JONES ON MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 1352.
3 POiMRoY's EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1220, n. 1 lists these persons by classes. Their
right to contribution after redemption from a mortgage is well established, id. § 1221,
and should apply as well to redemption from a tax sale.
17. Where, as in the instant case, the mortgagor is insolvent and the equity of re-
demption is worth less than the mortgage debt, the mortgagee has suffered a real financial
loss from the taking of his security and it would be inequitable to require him to risk
additional loss by redeeming the property. Further, contribution arises out of the unjust
enrichment of the defendants-here, the benefit of adding to the other mortgagees' se-
curity by satisfying the prior tax liens. REsTATEmENT, RESTITUTION (1937) § 1, coin-
ment b.
18. "The duty afterwards of contributing towards the payment on the ground of his
being also a co-tenant with the mortgagor, is a burden on the land alone, not a personal
1296 [Vol. 48
Should one of them exercise this privilege, there arise further problems, the
solution of which will vary according to the law of different states, as to the
payor's rights in his turn against those holding other interests in his par-
cel.' 9
Despite the rather complex incidental problems which thus arise where
pieces of property instead of persons are the "parties," the fundamental prin-
ciples of contribution remain, even in this situation, relatively simple. There
is no requirement of any particular type of relationship, or of any special
obligation beyond a common burden. The analogy of "impersonal co-sure-
ties" does not affect the existing rules; it merely serves, by a comparison
with a more familiar situation, to emphasize the identity of the principles
involved. In the light of these considerations the instant case presents all
necessary ingredients for contribution relief. The statute making the mort-
gagor's three pieces of property equally liable for county taxes, imposed on
all three a common burden which was inofficiously discharged in full by one
parcel. Under the "impersonal co-surety" analogy, settled contribution prin-
ciples dictate the granting of in rem decrees for contribution from the other
parcels. The fact that the court was unable to find in this situation sufficient
"reciprocal rights and duties" to justify granting any relief, is an illustra-
tion of the dangers accruing from an approach whic makes the abundance
or scarcity of direct precedent, rather than the logical application of broad
principles in new situations, the basis of decision.
duty, and he must be left to exercise his own option as to whether he will pay the mone"
and save his interest in the land, or refuse to pay and let his interest be foreclosed"
Lyon v. Robbins, 45 Conn. 513, 525 (1878); 2 JoNr-s o-i MonvA Es (8th ed. 1923)
§ 1393.
19. Between tenants in common there is the right of further contribution (note 8,
supra). Between successive mortgagees, a first mortgagee discharging the claim is gen-
erally limited to adding it to his mortgage debt and recovering on foreclosure. See
Comment (1935) 83 U. oF PA. L. REv. 780. WNhere a second mortgagee discharges the
claim, in some states he is subrogated to its priority over the first mortgagee, (1934)
11 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 655; Ky. STAT. Axrx. (Carroll, 1936) § 4032; but in others
he may be denied subrogation to such priority. Cf. Laventall v. Pomerantz, 263 N. Y.
110, 188 N. E. 271 (1933); (1934) 29 ILT. L. Rv. 123.
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